### **KU LEUVEN**

Reasoning about Object Capabilities with Logical Relations and Effect Parametricity (EuroS&P 2016, Saarbrücken)

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**Object capabilities** 

Reasoning about Object Capabilities

Encapsulation, shared data, authority

Reasoning about Primitive I/O

Conclusion

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### Example: browser ad sandboxing:

 $\begin{aligned} rnode &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \texttt{func}(node, d) \{ \cdots \} \\ initWebPage &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \texttt{func}(document, ad) \\ & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \texttt{let} (adNode = document.addChild(``ad\_div'')) \\ \texttt{let} (rAdNode = rnode(adNode, 0)) \\ ad.initialize(rAdNode) \end{array} \right\} \end{aligned}$ 

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- Fine-grained privilege separation.
- Control authority of arbitrary, untrusted, untyped code.
  - Just restrict what it has access to.
- Low tech, low overhead.
  - No types/...
  - Standard OO techniques/patterns.
- High-level OO languages or low-level assembly
- Applications:
  - sandboxing
  - fault isolation
  - auditability
  - etc.

## A capability-safe language:

- Private state encapsulation.
- Primitive I/O through non-public objects (like *document*).
- No global mutable state.

Examples:

- E, Joe-E, Emily, Newspeak etc.
- JavaScript 5 (strict mode, after proper initialisation)?

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```
\begin{aligned} rnode &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \texttt{func}(node, d) \{ \cdots \} \\ initWebPage &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \texttt{func}(document, ad) \\ & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \texttt{let} (adNode = document.addChild(``ad\_div'')) \\ \texttt{let} (rAdNode = rnode(adNode, 0)) \\ ad.initialize(rAdNode) \end{array} \right\} \end{aligned}
```

Are we 100% sure?

- What does the language guarantee precisely? Is it really capability-safe? What does that mean?
- What to ensure precisely?
- What can we rely on precisely?

OCap community:

- Reference graph
- "No Authority Amplification"
- "Only Connectivity Begets Connectivity"

Problem:

- Syntactic bound on authority.
- Ignores behavior.
- Necessary, but not sufficient!

What's the alternative?

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#### What's the alternative?

...logical relations... ...Kripke worlds... ...modular reasoning...

But applications?



Programming Languages Researcher



...privilege separation... ...capability-safety... ...security applications...

But how to reason?

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Register state machine to govern fresh data structure.

```
ticketDispenser \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \texttt{func}(attacker)
\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \texttt{let}(o = \texttt{ref } 0) \\ \texttt{let}(dispTkt = \texttt{func}()\{ \\ \texttt{let}(v = \texttt{deref } o)\{o := v + 2; v\}\}) \\ attacker(dispTkt); \\ \texttt{deref } o \end{array} \right\}
```



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Public transitions: accessible under current authority. Private transitions: potentially accessible by others.

 $\begin{aligned} rnode &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \texttt{func}(node, d) \{ \cdots \} \\ initWebPage &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \texttt{func}(document, ad) \\ & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \texttt{let} (adNode = document.addChild(``ad\_div")) \\ \texttt{let} (rAdNode = rnode(adNode, 0)) \\ ad.initialize(rAdNode) \end{array} \right\} \end{aligned}$ 



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Effect interpretation: custom property about primitive effects  $\begin{array}{l} \rho \in \mathcal{P}(Cap) \\ \mu \in \mathcal{P}(Val) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Expr) \end{array} + \text{admissibility conditions...} \end{array}$ 

Effect parametricity.

Theorem (Fundamental Theorem for  $\lambda_{JS})$ 

If  $\Gamma, \Sigma \vdash e$  then for a valid effect interpretation  $(\mu, \rho)$  and for all  $n, \gamma$ and w with  $(n, w) \in \llbracket \Sigma \rrbracket_{\mu,\rho}$  and  $(n, \gamma) \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket_{\mu,\rho} w$ , we have that  $(n, \gamma(e))$  must be in  $\mathcal{E}[\mu \text{ JSVal}_{\mu,\rho}] w$ .

- Capability Safety is:
  - Private state encapsulation.
  - Absence of global state.
  - Primitive I/O encapsulation.
- Modular reasoning in cap-safe language:
  - Reference graph dynamics is not enough
  - Logical relations to the rescue.
- Some novel features:
  - Authority over shared data using public/private transitions.
  - Effect parametricity.
- (Not shown: relational version)

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- Build effect interpretations into Kripke worlds?
- A program logic?
- Apply to full JavaScript?



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### Worlds:

$$\begin{split} & \text{IslandName} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{N} \\ & W \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ w \in \text{IslandName} \hookrightarrow \text{Island} \mid \text{dom}(w) \text{ finite} \} \\ & \text{Island} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \iota = (s, \phi, \phi^{\text{pub}}, H) \mid s \in \text{State} \land \phi \subseteq \text{State}^2 \land \\ & H \in \text{State} \to \text{StorePred} \land \phi^{\text{pub}} \subseteq \phi \land \\ & \phi, \phi^{\text{pub}} \text{ reflexive and transitive} \end{array} \right\} \\ & \text{StorePred} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \psi \in \hat{W} \to_{mon,ne} UPred(\text{Store}) \} \\ & roll : \frac{1}{2} \cdot W \cong \hat{W} \end{split}$$

#### Effect interpretations:

$$\rho: W \to_{mon,ne} UPred(Loc)$$
  
$$\mu: (W \to_{mon,ne} UPred(Val)) \to_{ne} (W \to_{ne} Pred(Cmd)).$$

JSVal<sub> $\mu,\rho$ </sub> predicate:

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{JSVal}_{\mu,\rho} &: W \to_{mon,ne} UPred(Val) \\ \mathsf{JSVal}_{\mu,\rho} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Cnst \cup \rho \cup \{\mathsf{JSVal}_{\mu,\rho}\} \cup ([\mathsf{JSVal}_{\mu,\rho}] \to \mu \; \mathsf{JSVal}_{\mu,\rho}) \end{split}$$

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Admissibility conditions for effect interpretation:

- A-Pure: If  $(n,v) \in P \ w$  then  $(n,v) \in \mu \ P \ w$
- A-BIND: If  $(n, cmd) \in \mu P w$  and  $(n', E\langle v \rangle) \in \mathcal{E}[\mu P'] w'$  for all  $n' \leq n, w' \sqsupseteq w$  and  $(n', v) \in P w'$ , then  $(n, E\langle cmd \rangle) \in \mathcal{E}[\mu P'] w$ .
- A-ASSIGN: If  $(n, v_1) \in JSVal_{\mu,\rho} w$  and  $(n, v_2) \in JSVal_{\mu,\rho} w$ , then  $(n, v_1 = v_2) \in \mu JSVal_{\mu,\rho} w$ .
- A-DEREF: If  $(n, v) \in JSVal_{\mu,\rho} w$ , (n, deref v) must be in  $\mu JSVal_{\mu,\rho} w$ .
- A-REF: If  $(n, v) \in \mathsf{JSVal}_{\mu, \rho} w$ , then  $(n, \mathsf{ref} v) \in \mu \mathsf{JSVal}_{\mu, \rho} w$ .

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