Access Permission Contracts for Scripting Languages

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Abstract

The ideal software contract fully specifies the behavior of an operation. Often, in particular in the context of scripting languages, a full specification may be cumbersome to state and may not even be desired. In such cases, a partial specification, which describes selected aspects of the behavior, may be used to raise the confidence in an implementation of the operation to a reasonable level.

We propose a novel kind of contract for object-based languages that specifies the side effects of an operation with access permissions. An access permission contract uses sets of access paths to express read and write permissions for the properties of the objects accessible from the operation.

We specify a monitoring semantics for access permission contracts and implement this semantics in a contract system for JavaScript. We prove soundness and stability of violation under increasing aliasing for our semantics.

Applications of access permission contracts include enforcing modularity, test-driven development, program understanding, and regression testing. With respect to testing and understanding, we find that adding access permissions to contracts increases the effectiveness of error detection through contract monitoring by 6-13%.

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1. Introduction

Design by contract is a methodology for software development based on specifications (contracts) of operations [24][35]. The correctness of an implementation with respect to a contract may be statically guaranteed by program verification or it may be dynamically checked via contract monitoring. As the latter variant permits more expressive specifications and puts less demands on the theorem proving skills of the programmer, it is widely used in practice as evidenced by implementations of contract checking in various forms and for many languages [1][14][17][24][26][28][44].

Originally, contracts were meant to provide full specifications. However, contracts for partial specifications, which only fix certain aspects of an operation, also have their uses. For example, in a dynamically-typed language, like Scheme or JavaScript, a contract could have the form of an expressive type signature and impose restrictions similar to a type system [2][24][33]. Contract monitoring for such type contracts detects type errors at operation boundaries.

A type contract has one important drawback. It only imposes restrictions on the values passed to an operation and returned from it. In an imperative language like Scheme or JavaScript, many operations have an effect on the heap, which is not captured by a type contract. For those operations, a contract that also specifies the effect would be more appropriate.

In the past, this drawback has driven the evolution of type systems towards effect systems that enable the specification and inference of side effects (e.g., [19][42]). In analogy, we propose to extend type contracts with a language-dependent notion of effects and to check them with an application-dependent notion of monitoring. In this paper, we develop a notion of effect suitable for scripting languages and for JavaScript in particular. The application scenarios that we have in mind are enforcing modularity, test-driven development, program understanding, and regression testing.

1.1 Effects for Scripting Languages

Like other scripting languages, JavaScript implements an object as a reference to a map from properties to values where some of the values may be objects again. Every read or write access to the resulting object graph can be described by a base object, a path (a sequence of property names), and a classifier indicating the operation on the last step of the path (read or write).

This observation has lead us to define effects by access permissions that specify a set of paths that an operation may read or write relative to some base object in scope. The base object may be this, an argument of the operation, or a global variable.

As an example, consider a JavaScript implementation of the widget class hierarchy described by the class diagram in Fig. 1. The layout operation computes the screen position of each widget. It accepts a pair of absolute starting coordinates and returns the width and height of the rendered widget. As a side effect, it stores the bounding box of each subwidget in its representation. A programmer working on the code of this operation might like to ascertain that the layout computation only ever changes the bounding box properties of a widget by attaching the following contract to the layout operation:

\[
\text{(int, int)} \rightarrow \{w: \text{int}, h: \text{int}\} \text{ with } [\text{this.}.*/x/y/w/h/]
\]

This contract specifies an operation that accepts two integers, returns an object with two integer properties named w and h, and modifies at most the x, y, w, and h properties of objects reachable through this. Furthermore, the contract allows the operation to...
read all properties reachable through this: a write path has to match the entire access permission, whereas a read path is accepted if it matches a prefix of the permission. More precisely, this specifies the base object, "." separates the path components, * matches any sequence of property names, and /\x/\y/\w/\h/ is a regular expression that matches the names of the properties with write permission.

Here are some further conventions for reading access paths. Parameters can be specified as base objects for a path by name or using a positional notation $1$, $2$, …, $n$. The symbol $?$ is short for the regular expression /\x/\y/\w/\h/ that matches any property name. A path ending in $\emptyset$ indicates a read-only path.

1.2 Application Scenarios

Regarding the application scenarios, contract monitoring for the layout contract is useful during the initial test-driven development of the code because any violation of the access permission triggers an exception as part of a test run. It is also useful for program understanding. A programmer who would like to confirm that the layout operation works in the outlined way would impose the understanding that matches the names of the properties with write permission.

The access permissions also indicate what operations are independent of one another. For example, an operation that marks those widgets which are visible in a given viewport might have a contract like this:

$$\{vx: \text{int}, vy: \text{int}, vw: \text{int}, vh: \text{int}\} \rightarrow \text{any}$$

with $\{1.?\emptyset, \text{this}.//r/\emptyset, /x/\emptyset/\emptyset/\emptyset, \text{this}.//l/\emptyset/\emptyset\}$. The path, $1.?\emptyset$, grants read access to any property of the first parameter, but no write permission; only the bounding box of a widget may be read; and only its visible property may be written. Only $l$ and $r$ properties may be traversed recursively along the last two paths. In regression testing, changes to the code that violate the contract are detected early in a run of a test suite, assuming sufficient coverage.

Last, but not least, modularity: JavaScript programs often rely on a number of libraries and freely include third-party code (mash-ups) that may change arbitrarily between different program runs. Programmers do not want this code to corrupt their global variables or to inflict arbitrary changes on their object structures. Wrapping a monitored contract around the third-party code confines these effects and guarantees the integrity of the program’s state.

1.3 Monitoring of Effects

There are two approaches to defining a semantics of monitoring for an access permission. The location-based semantics attaches permissions to each object location. It traverses the object graph starting from the base object according to the access paths and registers a read or write permission (according to the path’s classification) for each object property along the path. In contrast, the path-based semantics pairs each object reference with an access permission. It presents an operational semantics of contract monitoring for the third-party code confines these effects and guarantees the integrity of the program’s state.

In the absence of aliasing, the location-based semantics is equivalent to the path-based semantics. In general, however, the semantics differ, which indicates that they serve different purposes. The following example highlights the differences. It is further elaborated in Sec. 2.

Suppose an object is reachable from the base object via two different paths, where one path grants write permission for property $p$, but a second path only grants read permission to $p$. With the path-based semantics, the path used to access the object determines the permission, but which permission should be granted by the location-based semantics? If $p$ gets write permission, then an execution that arrives at the object via the read path can write. If $p$ only gets read permission, then an execution that arrives at the object via the write path cannot write. To prevent this counterintuitive behavior in the second scenario, the location-based semantics must assign the least restrictive permission of all paths reaching $p$. A similar dilemma may arise between “no permission” and “permission to read.”

Both location- and path-based semantics are non-trivial to implement efficiently. With the location-based semantics, the installation of a contract requires that the locations of all objects reachable through the contract’s access paths must be marked with access rights. This marking cannot be delayed because aliasing may provide a shortcut into a data structure on which the contract grants read or write permission. In the worst case, the time needed to install a contract is bounded only by the size of the entire object graph. A read or write operation can be implemented in almost constant time.

In contrast, the path-based semantics requires time linear in the number of installed contracts for each read and write operation, whereas the installation of a contract takes constant time. Read operations are a bit trickier because they have to juggle access paths in the right way (see Sec. 2).

This paper explores the path-based semantics because it is the semantics of choice for our intended application scenarios as explained in Sec. 2. The location-based semantics most likely has a role to play in monitoring access control in a security scenario, but it is based on a different set of assumptions and a separate investigation is required to explore it (see Sec. 3).

Contributions

1. Design of a contract framework with access permissions.
2. Specification of a path-based formal semantics of access permissions and their dynamic enforcement.
3. Formal proof that the semantics guarantees stability of access violations under addition of aliasing, subject to mild conditions.
4. Prototype implementation of access permissions with monitoring in a contract and testing framework for JavaScript based on program transformation.
5. Assessment of the effectiveness of access permission contracts by observing the impact of random code modifications on hand-annotated case studies.
6. Practical evaluation of the approach on different code bases.

Outline

In Sec. 2 we explain the design choices underlying our contract framework with examples and explore some of the alternatives. Section 3 presents a formal framework for reasoning about access permissions. It presents an operational semantics of contract monitoring and formally defines and proves two properties that are consequences of the design choices. Section 4 explains the basic approach taken by the implementation. The evaluation in Sec. 5 explores the effectiveness of access permission for detecting programming errors using mutation testing.

2. Design Choices

For each programmer, an access permission has an intuitive meaning that coincides with the intuition of other programmers in the vast majority of cases. These intuitions differ when aliasing comes into play, because each programmer has different application scenarios in mind, each with its own requirements to the semantics.

As already indicated in the introduction, our intention is to employ access permissions as partial specifications of a program’s effect. We regard it as a dynamic counterpart to previous work on static effect systems [19, 22]. This intention motivates the four major design choices we have taken for the monitoring semantics for access permissions.
Path-Dependent Access An access permission grants the right to read or modify a property of an object depending on the path through which the object has been reached.

Dynamic Extent An access permission for a function is in force for the duration of a function activation.

Pre-State Snapshot An access permission only applies to objects and paths in the heap at the time the contract is installed.

Sticky Update A property assignment keeps the access paths of the value on its right-hand side.

The rest of this section explains the choices in depth, gives a critical overview of the alternatives, and thus provides a rationale for the design of our framework.

2.1 Path-Dependent Access

An access permission grants the right to read or modify a property of an object depending on the path through which the object has been reached.

This choice has two consequences.

Reference Attachment Permissions are attached to individual references, not to heap locations. That is, if two variables or properties hold a reference to the same object, then accesses through each variable may have different access rights.

Stability of Violation An access violation is preserved under increased aliasing. See Sec. 3.5 for a formal statement.

Section 1.3 already argues in favor of the path-based semantics. Here, we give a concrete example where the location-based semantics behaves different from a static analysis.

Any modular attempt to verify h’s access permissions statically (for example, using the dynamic frame rule of Smans and coworkers[40]) cannot assume that x = y. Without this assumption the analysis would fail because the contract disallows the access to y.b in line 4.

The path-based semantics is consistent with such an analysis: Any invocation of h—in particular the call from h1—triggers a contract violation regardless of the aliasing among the arguments. We call this behavior stability of violation.

With the location-based semantics, h1 would not trigger a violation. As x and y are aliased, their underlying location would obtain permission to write properties a and b and the two assignments would go through without violation. Furthermore, the location-based semantics breaks stability of violation. Calling h without aliasing as in h2 detects a violation.

In a security setting, the location-based semantics appears better suited because a permission like window."/(?!location$)./" seems to rule out any access to the location property of the window object, even if this object has been reached via some alias. However, the following example demonstrates that this appearance is deceptive:

As x and window are aliases of one another, the permission x.? grants write permission for all properties of window and the permission window."/(?!location$)./" grants write permission for all properties of window, except location. Hence, the location-based semantics permits writing to window.location in the body of k.

For the record, the path-based semantics does not trigger a violation, either: for all x, any property of x may be read and written; for window, all properties except location may be read and written. The body of k does not exceed these permissions, so no violation can happen.

2.2 Dynamic Extent

An access permission for a function is in force for the duration of a function activation.

If a permission is attached to a function, then each invocation of the function installs an instance of the permission and this same instance is withdrawn at the matching function return.

As a consequence, permissions get refined in a chain of function calls. Because an access permission expresses the promise that the contracted function does not exceed its permissions, each additional function call can only restrict the accessible properties further. For example, consider these functions:

The contract of function d2 disallows any access to its argument. Invoking d2 with any object triggers a violation of d2’s contract when trying to execute line 22, although this line is in d1, which has a more permissive contract.

As another consequence, a closure returned from a function is not restricted by the access permission of the function. For example, consider the permission of f in this code fragment:

Running the function f1, which is unrestricted (because there is no contract associated with f1), returns "secret revealed". It does not violate the contract of f because the access to x.a happens outside the dynamic extent of the call to f in line 28.

The choice for dynamic extent is inspired by the distinction between direct and latent effects in static effect systems. Evaluation of the function expression in line 29 does not cause an access to x.a or x.b. For this reason, a static effect system categorizes this effect as a latent effect and places it on top of the function arrow in its type. When the function is applied, the effect is exercised. However, at that point, there is no contract in force that would restrict the effect.

On the other hand, the following variant of the program fragment leads to a violation.
function \( g(x) \) {
    return function() { return x.a + x.b; };
}

As the invocation of \( r() \) happens in the extent of the invocation of \( g \), its permission \( [x.b] \) is in force and the violation by accessing \( x.a \) is detected. In contrast, the function \( g \) by itself does not impose any restriction on accesses to \( x \), so that a direct call to \( g \) does not lead to a violation.

An alternative design would consider access permissions as contagious (having static extent determined by lexical scope) and have closures capture the permissions in force at their definition site. This design seems more appropriate in a security setting and it would report violations for the examples involving functions \( f \) and \( g \).

### 2.3 Pre-State Snapshot

An access permission only applies to objects and paths in the heap at the time when the contract is installed.

One immediate implication of this choice is that the program can access and modify newly allocated objects without restriction. As these objects are not present in the heap snapshot at installation time (the pre-state), the contract does not restrict access to them. This behavior is analogous to the treatment of the assignable clause and newly allocated objects in JML [31, 37].

We see two alternatives to this design but consider neither viable: to choose a different reference heap or to choose a different interpretation of access paths.

The only other reference heap for a contract would be the post-state of a function, that is, the heap at the time the contract is withdrawn. However, the final heap is not a sensible choice because the programmer expects the paths in a contract to refer to the situation at the time a function is invoked. The final heap may exhibit very different paths.

Another interpretation of access paths might consider the permissions as symbolic paths that may be traversed regardless of the changes in the underlying heap. This interpretation violates the programmer’s intuition and it is inconsistent with static verification as the following example shows.

```plaintext
/\s (obj, obj) \rightarrow any with [x.a, y.a, y.a.b] */
function b(x, y) {
    y.a = x.a;
    y.a.b = 42; // allowed?
}
```

Reading just the contract, a programmer expects that \( x.a.b \) does not change. However, the symbolic interpretation of paths would not flag the assignment in line 47 which changes \( x.a.b \) counter to the expectation of the programmer. In contrast, a static verification of access permissions [40] keeps track that \( y.a \) is really \( x.a \) in line 47 and rejects the function. The pre-state snapshot interpretation is consistent to static verification and reports a violation.

### 2.4 Sticky Update

A property assignment keeps the access paths of the value on its right-hand-side.

A property assignment of the form \( x.p = y \), where \( y \) refers to an object, creates a new path through \( x.p \) to the object graph reachable from \( y \). Sticky update means that the access information for \( y \) is kept along with the reference so that a subsequent access through \( x.p \) is considered an access through \( y \). This choice is compliant with the Hoare-calculus rule for assignment:

\[
\{ P[y/x.p] \} \ x.p = y \{ P \}
\]

For suppose that \( P[y/x.p] \) is the predicate “location \( \ell \) is reachable from location \( \ell \) via some path \( \gamma \) and \( y = \ell^\gamma \). Then a suitable candidate for \( P \) is “location \( \ell \) is reachable from location \( \ell \) via some path \( \gamma \) and \( x.p = y = \ell^\gamma \).

Here is an example.

```plaintext
/\s (obj) \rightarrow any with [x.a.x.b.a] */
function l(x) {
    x.a = x.b;
    x.a.a = 42;
}

function m1() {
    var x = { a: {}, b: {});
    l(x);
}
```

In this code fragment, line 51 is clearly permitted as \( x.a \) may be assigned to and \( x.b \) may be read. The following read access to \( x.a \) in line 52 returns the reference to the object that was accessible through \( x.b \) when the permission was installed. As this object is the one that was reachable via \( x.b \) in the pre-state, the access permission for \( x.b \) counts so that the assignment to \( x.a.a \) is sanctioned by the path \( x.b.a \). Thus, function \( l() \) runs without violation!

Things look different in a slightly modified version of the example that creates the alias before installing the permission.

```plaintext
/\s (obj) \rightarrow any with [x.a.x.b.a] */
function m(x) {
    var y = x.a;
    y.a = 42; // violation
}

function m1() {
    var x = { a: {}, b: {});
    x.a = x.b;
    m(x);
}
```

In this case, running \( m1() \) yields a violation. While the first read access to \( x.a \) in line 60 is sanctioned by \( x.a \), the write access to property \( a \) of this object is not. Indeed, this behavior is consistent with invoking \( m \) on an object without any aliasing, which reports a violation under any semantics [41].

### 3. Formalization

A formal semantics of monitoring for access permissions is needed as the basis of an implementation that adheres to the design choices. For that reason, we define the calculus \( \lambda_{AP} \) as a call-by-value lambda calculus extended with objects and access permissions. For this calculus, we specify the semantics, including monitoring, and prove that it adheres to the properties stated in Sec. 2, in particular, pre-state snapshot and stability of violation.

Let’s fix some notation before we start. Given sets \( A \) and \( B \), we write \( \varphi(A) \) for the power set of \( A \), \( A + B \) for the disjoint union of \( A \) and \( B \), and \( A \times B \) for their Cartesian product. \( A \rightarrow B \) denotes the set of finite (partial) functions from \( A \) to \( B \) with \( \emptyset \) standing for the empty mapping and if \( f \in A \rightarrow B \), then \( dom(f) \subseteq A \) denotes the domain of \( f \) and \( f|_{A'} \) denotes the restriction of \( f \) to \( A' \subseteq A \).

The updated function \( f' = f[a \mapsto b] \) is defined by \( f'(a) = b \) and \( f'(a') = f(a') \), for all \( a' \neq a \). We also write \( [a \mapsto b] \subseteq A \times B \) for the singleton map with domain \( \{ a \} \). If we write \( f(a) \) as part of a premise, this use implies the additional premise \( a \in dom(f) \).
variable \( x \in \text{Var} \)
property name \( p \in \text{Prop} \)
access path \( \pi \in \text{Path} = \text{Prop}^* \)
path language \( L \in \text{Plang} = \wp(\text{Path}) \)
expression \( e \in \text{Expr} \)

\[
\begin{align*}
&::= x \mid \lambda x.e \mid e(e) \\
&\mid \text{new } | e.p \mid e.p := e \\
&\text{permit } x : L_r, L_w \text{ in } e
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 2. Syntax.

3.1 Syntax

Figure 2 specifies the syntax of \( \lambda_m \). The calculus extends a call-by-value lambda calculus with object construction (\( \text{new} \) creates a fresh object devoid of properties), reading of an object’s property, and writing/defining an object’s property. The syntax is close to that of existing JavaScript core languages [23, 25].

The novel construct of the calculus is the access permission expression \( \text{permit } x : L_r, L_w \text{ in } e \) that restricts accesses through variable \( x \) during evaluation of \( e \) governed by the two languages \( L_r \) and \( L_w \). Both languages specify a set of access paths (sequences of properties) starting from the object bound to \( x \) (which must be in scope). Read accesses to descendants of \( x \) are limited to paths in \( L_r \) whereas write access are limited to paths in \( L_w \). Evaluation of \( e \) stops if it tries to perform any access that is not permitted.

The read language \( L_r \) should be prefix closed, because it does not make sense to permit reading of \( x.a.b \) without permitting to read \( x.a \). Similarly, writing to \( x.a.b \) is not possible without reading \( x.a \). First. So, each path in the read language \( L_w \) should extend a path in the read language by one property, that is, \( L_w \subseteq \{ \pi.p \mid \pi \in L_r, p \in \text{Prop} \} \).

Our implementation restricts \( L_r \) and \( L_w \) to regular languages so that the word problem is decidable for them. Furthermore, contracts with access permissions can only be attached to functions and a contract can state multiple permits in one go.

3.2 Semantics

Figure 3 defines the semantic domains and the inference rules for a big-step evaluation judgment of the form

\[ \rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H ; u ; e \rightarrow H'; u'; v \]

This judgment declares that given a environment \( \rho \) and indexed collections \( \mathcal{R} \) and \( \mathcal{W} \) of read and write permissions, the expression \( e \) transforms the initial heap \( H \) to the final heap \( H' \) and returns value \( v \). Furthermore, it threads a time stamp \( u, u' \in \text{Stamp} \) that is calculated at each heap operation and at each permit expression. The permission collections \( \mathcal{R} \) and \( \mathcal{W} \) are indexed by the time stamps of the heaps for which the permissions were granted. The time stamp of a permission uniquely identifies different executions of permit expressions and determines their relative order with respect to heap modifications.

A value \( v \in \text{Val} \) is either a reference or a closure consisting of an environment and a lambda expression. The representation of a reference is a pair of a heap address \( \ell \) and a collection \( M \) of access paths, indexed by time stamps. The collection \( M \) records all permitted access paths that have been traversed during evaluation so far to obtain this reference value. The indexing is again used for marking modifications with time stamps. This representation is dictated by the design choice of path dependency (see Sec 2.1).

A heap maps a location to an object and an object maps a property name to a pair of a heap address and a value. The time stamp indicates the time of the write operation that last assigned the property. It is required to implement the “sticky update” from Sec 2.3.

Semantic domains

\[
\begin{align*}
\ell &\in \text{Loc} \quad \text{infinite set of locations} \\
\mathcal{U} &\subseteq \text{Prop} \quad \text{information set} \\
\mathcal{H} &\subseteq \text{Heap} \quad \text{locations} \\
\mathcal{O} &\subseteq \text{Obj} \quad \text{objects} \\
\mathcal{P} &\subseteq \text{Stamp} \quad \text{time stamps} \\
\mathcal{M} &\subseteq \text{Plang} \quad \text{path languages} \\
\rho &\subseteq \text{Env} \quad \text{environments} \\
\rho_0 &\subseteq \text{Env} \quad \text{initial environment} \\
\rho' &\subseteq \text{Env} \quad \text{updated environment}
\end{align*}
\]

Checking permissions

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{CHECK PERMISSION} &\quad \forall u \in \text{dom}(\mathcal{P}) \cap \text{dom}(\mathcal{M}) : \mathcal{M}(u) \in \mathcal{P}(u) \\
\mathcal{P} &\subseteq \mathcal{M}
\end{align*}
\]

Evaluation rules

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{VAR} &\quad \rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H ; u ; x \rightarrow H ; u ; \rho(x) \\
\text{LAM} &\quad \rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H ; u ; \lambda x.e \rightarrow H ; u ; (\rho \downarrow \lambda x.e, \lambda x.e) \\
\text{APP} &\quad \rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H ; u ; e_0 \rightarrow H ; u' ; (\rho, \lambda x.e) \\
&\quad \rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H ; u ; e_1 \rightarrow H ; u ; v_1 \\
&\quad \rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H ; u ; e \rightarrow H''' ; u'' ; v \quad \rho \triangleright u_1 \rangle, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H'' ; u' ; e \rightarrow H''' ; u'' ; v \\
\text{NEW} &\quad \rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W} \vdash H ; u ; \text{new } (e_1) \rightarrow H''' ; u'' ; v \\
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 3. Semantics.

The evaluation rules \text{VAR}, \text{LAM}, and \text{APP} for variable, lambda abstraction, and function application expressions are standard. They thread the time stamp and propagate the permissions \( \mathcal{R} \) and \( \mathcal{W} \) unchanged to their sub-evaluations, if any.

The evaluation rule \text{NEW} creates a new object in the heap. The new object has no properties and its collection of access paths is empty. The latter indicates that the newly created object is completely unrestricted (following Sec 2.3). Any of its properties may be read or written. The time stamp does not change when allocating a new object because no object in the current heap is modified.

The put rule specifies the operation that writes and (if necessary) defines a property. It first computes the location \( \ell \) and the collection \( M \) of access paths of the object and then checks the write permission to the object with the premise \( \mathcal{W} \triangleright \mathcal{M} \). It overwrites the object’s property with the new value and assigns it
a new, incremented time stamp to implement the “sticky update” (Sec. 2.4). Hence, the time stamp of a property is always the time of its last update.

The rule get defines the read operation of object properties. It relies on some auxiliary operations defined in Figure 4. It first expects e to evaluate to a reference (ℓ, M), which denotes the base object for the property read. In this reference, ℓ is the heap address of the object and M contains a collection of access paths for the object corresponding to heap traversals reaching this object, one path for each active access permission. The other premise \( R \cap M \) checks the read permission for these paths extended with property p. This check is specified by rule check permission which requires that, for each active access permission with time stamp u, the current access path for u is an element of the set of permitted access paths for u, i.e., \( \mathcal{P}(u) \).

If the read operation is permitted, then there are two possibilities. If the property contains a closure, then this closure is the result of \( e.p \). However, if the property contains an object reference, say \( (\ell', N) \), then this read operation has discovered that the paths in \( M' \) are also access paths for object \( \ell' \). The reference value returned from the read operation must somehow merge the different ways to reach \( \ell' \) via \( N \) and via \( M.p \). Computing the desired collection of access paths depends on the last time \( u \) when the property \( \ell.p \) was updated. This complication is required to adhere to the pre-state snapshot property (Sec. 2.3).

The operator \( \otimes \) in Fig. 4 implements the required merger operation. Its right-hand argument comprises the contents of an object’s property: \((u, v)\) where \( u \) is the time stamp of the last update and \( v \) the stored value. Its left-hand argument is the collection \( M' = M.p \) of newly discovered paths to the property. If \( v \) is not a reference, then \( \otimes \) just returns \( v \) as already discussed. Otherwise, \( v = (\ell', N) \) in which case it returns the location \( \ell' \) paired with the collection of paths computed by the operator \( \otimes_u \) applied to the new paths \( M' \) and the old paths \( N \).

In an application \( M \otimes_u N \), the first argument \( M \) contains the access paths that were detected when checking the read access. The second argument \( N \) contains the access paths as they are stored in the heap at location \( \ell' \). The subscript \( u \) is the time stamp of the last write to the property. The definition in Figure 4 distinguishes three cases depending on when the property has been written last and what access paths were given to the written value. Let \( u' \) be the time stamp of an execution of a permit expression.
expression. The code fragment (a) installs the permission before creating an alias with the assignment $x.a = x.b$ whereas version (b) installs the permission afterwards. In both cases, let the permission expression be associated with time stamp $\ell_b$.

In fragment (a), the expression $x.b$ in line 6 returns the location $\ell_b$ paired with the map $[u' \mapsto b]$ (case 2 of $\odot_u$), because it was generated by the preceding assignment $x.a = x.b$. This value is written to $x.a$. The following access to $x.a$ returns $(\ell_u, [u' \mapsto b])$ according to case 1 of $\odot_u$, which governs that the paths stored in the object take precedence over the actual path taken. For the final write access, the extended access map $[u' \mapsto b.a]$ is checked against the set of write permissions and succeeds.

In fragment (b), $x.a = x.b$ is executed before the permit expression. Hence, $x.a$ contains $(\ell_b, 0)$ and the get rule makes it return $(\ell_u, [u' \mapsto a])$ according to case 2 of $\odot_u$. For the write operation, the extended access map $[u' \mapsto a.a]$ is checked against the set of write permissions and fails.

The code in Figure 6(c) exercises case 3 of the definition of $\odot_u$. After establishing the two permissions, the environment $\rho$ is: $[x \mapsto (\ell_u, [u_1 \mapsto e]), y \mapsto (\ell_y, [u_2 \mapsto e])]$ where the $u_i$ are sorted according to their indexes $i$. After the assignment $x.a = y$ (with time stamp $u_3$) the object in location $\ell_x$ is: $\{a : (u_4, (\ell_y, [u_2 \mapsto e]))\}$. In line 7, $x.a$ evaluates to $[u_3 \mapsto a] \odot (u_4, (\ell_y, [u_2 \mapsto e]))$

$$\ell_y, [u_3 \mapsto a] \odot u_4 \Rightarrow \ell_y, [u_2 \mapsto e]$$

Observe that case 3 of $\odot_u$ applies because $u_4 \geq u_3$. As a consequence, $u_3$ vanishes from the domain of the map because the object that was reachable via $x.a$ before line 6 has become garbage. With this reasoning the update of $x.a.a$ is permitted because it is equivalent to $y.a$ and realizable in the heap after line 5.

### 3.4 Pre-state Snapshot

Our first technical result is a soundness result that underlines that our semantics adheres to the pre-state snapshot property (Sec. 2.3). It ensures that any value produced during evaluation contains correct path information with respect to all relevant pre-states in the following sense. Consider a reference value of the form $v = (\ell, M)$ where $M$ is a map from time stamps to access paths. For each timestamp $u \in \dom(M)$ there is an access permission installed at time $u$ for heap $H_u$ with base object $\ell_u$ that affects the value $v$. The information contained in $M$ is correct with respect to $u$ if there is a path from the base object $\ell_u$ to $\ell$ along the properties of $M(u)$ in the pre-state heap $H_u$.

To formally define this notion, suppose the information about the pre-states and the base objects of all contract installations is gathered in a time-stamped indexed foretime map $\mathcal{F} : \text{Stamp} \to (\text{Loc} \times \text{Heap})$. It maps the time stamp $u$ of the installation of an access permission to a pair $(\ell_u, H_u)$, where $\ell_u$ is the location of the base object and $H_u$ is the heap snapshot at that time.

**Definition 3.1** Let $\mathcal{F}$ be a foretime map.

A value $v$ is $\mathcal{F}$ path consistent if

- $v = (\rho, \lambda x. e)$ and $\rho$ is $\mathcal{F}$ path consistent or

\[ v = (\ell, M) \text{ and, for all } u \in \dom(M), \text{ if } \mathcal{F}(u) = (\ell_u, H_u), \text{ then there is a path from } \ell_u \text{ to } \ell \text{ along } M(u) \text{ in } H_u. \]

An environment $\rho$ is $\mathcal{F}$ path consistent if, for all $x \in \dom(\rho)$, $\rho(x)$ is $\mathcal{F}$ path consistent.

A heap $H$ is $\mathcal{F}$ path consistent if all values stored in all object properties are $\mathcal{F}$ path consistent. That is, for all $\ell \in \dom(H)$ and for all $p \in \dom(H(\ell))$, if $H(\ell)(p) = (u, v)$, then $v$ is $\mathcal{F}$ path consistent.

To gather the foretime map, a suitably extended evaluation judgment $\rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{F} \vdash \ell, u : e \mapsto H'; u'; v$ is required. It records the base object and the heap snapshot at each successful contract installation in the foretime map $\mathcal{F}$. Fig. 6 contains the foretime map in exactly the same way as $\mathcal{R}$ and $\mathcal{W}$.

Showing adherence to the pre-state snapshot property amounts to proving that an evaluation that starts on a path consistent heap and environment produces a path consistent heap and value.

**Theorem 3.1** Suppose that $\rho, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{F} \vdash \ell, u : e \mapsto H'; u'; v$.

If $\rho$ and $H$ are $\mathcal{F}$ path consistent, then so are $H'$ and $v$.

There is also an accompanying completeness result that guarantees that the $M$ component of a reference value is non-empty if it has been accessed via a pre-state path (see appendix).

### 3.5 Stability of Violation

Stability of violation is a property linked to the reference attachment property (Sec. 2.1). It states that a violation of an access permission is preserved (in a precisely defined sense) when performing the same computation on a heap with more aliasing.

Let’s first fix what we mean with “more aliasing.” If $H_1$ and $H_2$ are heaps, then $H_2$ has more aliasing if it identifies locations that are distinct in $H_1$ and merges the contents of the objects in these locations. That is, if $o'$ and $o''$ are distinct objects in $H_1$ which are merged to object $o$ in $H_2$, then $o$ has all properties from $o'$ and $o''$. Properties present in $o'$ and $o''$ must have suitably related values that map into the same value in $H_2$. We call $H_1$ a refinement of $H_2$ because it makes more distinctions between objects.

**Definition 3.2** A heap $H_1$ is a $\gamma$-refinement of heap $H_2$, written as $H_1 \gtrsim \gamma H_2$, if $\gamma : \dom(H_1) \to \dom(H_2)$ is a surjective mapping between heap locations and $\forall \ell_1 \in \dom(H_1), \forall o_1 \in H_1(\ell_1), o_2 = H_2(\gamma(\ell_1))$.

**RH1** $\dom(o_1) \subseteq \dom(o_2)$ (objects in the refined heap have fewer properties) and

**RH2** $(\forall p \in \dom(o_1)) o_1(p) = (u_1, v_1) \land o_2(p) = (u_2, v_2) \land u_1 = u_2 \Rightarrow v_1 \gtrsim v_2$

A value is a $\gamma$-refinement of another, $v_1 \gtrsim \gamma v_2$ if

**RV1** $v_1 = (\ell_1, M_1)$ and $v_2 = (\ell_2, M_2)$ and $\ell_2 = \gamma(\ell_1)$ and $M_1 = M_2$, or

**RV2** $v_1 = (\rho_1, e_1)$ and $v_2 = (\rho_2, e_2)$ and $\rho_1 \gtrsim \rho_2$ and $e_1 = e_2$.

An environment is a $\gamma$-refinement of another, $\rho_1 \gtrsim \gamma \rho_2$ if

**RE1** $\dom(\rho_1) = \dom(\rho_2)$ and

**RE2** $(\forall x \in \dom(\rho_1)) \rho_1(x) \gtrsim \gamma \rho_2(x)$.

The reader might wonder about the implication in RH2. This choice allows the coarser heap $H_2$ to contain a value which does not refine to all corresponding values in heap $H_1$: for each object in $H_2$, there may be any number of $\gamma$-preimages of this object in $H_1$. RH2 says that such an object need not be consistent with all
its preimages. This case can be detected by the condition $u_1 < u_2$: the shared version of the object has been updated after one of its unshared preimages. The remaining case $u_1 > u_2$ can never arise.

We allow such inconsistencies in a heap refinement because they only influence the semantics of a program if there is a subsequent read operation that observes the inconsistency. In this case, the criterion $u_1 < u_2$ detects the inconsistency.

Having established the notion of heap refinement, it remains to formalize running the same program on two heaps and compare their preimages. This case can be detected by the condition $\rho < \rho'$. Each judgment formalizes an interrupted evaluation. The superscript $\rho$ indicates violation of a read permission (rule GET-CRASH2), superscript $\rho'$ indicates violation of a write permission (rule PUT-CRASH3), and superscript $O$ indicates nondeterministically giving up on a read operation (rule GET-CRASH3).

The remaining rules are straightforward variants of the evaluation rules in Fig. 3 that propagate an error condition like an exception.

Our theorem says that crashes due to violated read or write permissions are preserved when more aliasing is added. The main complication is that an inconsistent read operation (in the sense discussed after Definition 3.2) in the version with additional aliasing may lead to arbitrary behavior of the program, including nontermination. Therefore, the theorem constructs a related execution on the heap $H$ using the access permission attached to the access path stored in the wrapper of the corresponding value.

Theorem 3.2 If $H_1 \Rightarrow_H H_2$ and $\rho_1 \Rightarrow_\rho \rho_2$ and

\[ \rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e \Rightarrow^t \] (1)

(for $i \in \{R, W\}$) then

\[ \rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e \Rightarrow^t \] (2)

such that either $i = j$ or $j = O$ and the derivation of (2) ends in an inconsistent read operation with respect to (1).

Informally, the proof constructs a derivation of (2) by induction on a derivation of (1). As $H_1 \Rightarrow_H H_2$, it is either the case that (1) always reads the same values from the heap as $H_1$. In this case, the derivation of (2) is isomorphic to the derivation of (1) such that applying this rule as part of (2) would return a different value. A sufficient criterion for this case is to check if $u_1 < u_2$ when reading the property as shown in RH2. In this case,

\[ \rho, R, W \vdash H; u; e \Rightarrow H'; u'; (\ell, \mathcal{M}) \quad \Rightarrow_\Delta \mathcal{M}.p \]

we give up, emit a GET-CRASH rule instead of GET, and complete the derivation with propagation rules for $\Rightarrow^t$.

The theorem also holds in a language with conditionals as they can be simulated in the lambda calculus. If the language was extended with pointer equality, then a condition might turn out differently on $H_2$ than on $H_1$. However, Theorem 3.2 would still hold if a rule analogous to GET-CRASH3 were introduced that allowed us to derive a $\Rightarrow^t$ judgment in (1) instead of executing an inconsistent pointer equality.

### 4. Implementation

The implementation of the framework for monitoring access permissions is available on the Web. It consists of two parts. The first part is an off-line JavaScript-to-JavaScript compiler written in OCaml. The second part is a JavaScript library that handles the dynamic aspects of enforcing access permissions.

The implementation supports the JavaScript language according to the standard except for prototypes and the with statement. As demonstrated in Sec. 3, contracts can be attached to a function or method in a special kind of comment /*...*/.

The compiler transforms the annotated code such that it monitors access permissions at run time. Figure 8 illustrates some of the transformation steps in a simplified form. All operations that involve heap accesses, like reading and writing of properties, are redirected to library functions that dynamically manage access permissions. These library functions introduce wrappers for references that remember the access paths of the wrapped reference.

![Figure 8. Transformation rules (simplified excerpt).](http://proglang.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/jscontest/)

Figure 8. Transformation rules (simplified excerpt).

```java
/** (any) -> any */
function f(x) {
  var z = x.a;
  return z.b;
}
TESTS.c1 = ...
function enableWrapper(f)(x) {
  var z = pRead(x,"a");
  return z.b;
}
}
```

Figure 9. Example of a transformation.

1. See appendix.

2. See appendix.

The theorem also holds in a language with conditionals as they can be simulated in the lambda calculus. If the language was extended with pointer equality, then a condition might turn out differently on $H_2$ than on $H_1$. However, Theorem 3.2 would still hold if a rule analogous to GET-CRASH3 were introduced that allowed us to derive a $\Rightarrow^t$ judgment in (1) instead of executing an inconsistent pointer equality.
which function is applied at a call site, the framework strips the access meta data from parameter objects before passing them to the function. It stores the meta data on a global stack that is used to rewrap the objects if the callee itself is a transformed function. This approach is compatible with uses of eval: code generated by eval can execute, but its read and write operations are not monitored.

For interoperability with non-transformed code, it is also necessary to remove wrappers when storing object properties. To this end, an additional map (._infos_) is attached to each object. This map stores the wrappers for each of the properties. The function pRead uses this map to reconstruct wrapped objects if necessary.

As the library stores the access path information in the ._infos_ property of the objects, this property must not become accessible to user code. Therefore, we provide a substitute for hasOwnProperty (hoP) that masks out the ._infos_ property. We also transform the statement for (var i in e) { s } to ensure that internal properties used by the implementation do not leak out to the program. Technically, this protection is achieved by changing the body s to if (hoP(o,i)) { s }. The functions pRead and pAssign also safeguard the special property ._infos_.

If native code or non-transformed code iterates over all properties of an object, then it is not possible to hide the ._infos_ property. We are not aware of any way to reliably hide this property short of modifying the underlying JavaScript engine. However, in the case studies that we performed the special property caused no problem.

Some features of JavaScript are not covered by the core calculus from Sect. 3, most notably prototypes and the with statement. In both cases, it turns out that write operations are not a problem: a property write never gets propagated to a prototype object and the with statement only changes the meaning of property reads.

A proper semantics of property reads in the presence of prototypes would first check the permission on the original object, check the presence of the property, and then recursively continue with the prototype object, until the property is not found or there is no further prototype. Our present implementation does not implement this semantics. It only checks the top-level permissions and relies on the built-in prototype resolution to do the actual read operation. Thus, it ignores restrictions imposed on a prototype object.

A proper semantics of with statements would have to proceed similarly, but traversing the stack of objects associated with currently open with statements for each access to a local variable. Our implementation does not support with at all because our case studies do not require it.

While an extension of the transformation to support prototypes and the with statement is possible, it does not appear sensible because it would require mimicking yet more details of the underlying execution engine (possibly introducing mismatches). Hence, we are working on an implementation inside a JavaScript engine, where it should be simple to overcome the restrictions of our transformation-based implementation with only a moderate impact on performance. For example, hiding the metadata and ensuring that it does not affect program execution is straightforward. Similarly, it is possible to monitor property reads and writes of native functions to fully support prototypes, eval, and dynamically loaded code. Due to the direct access to the scope chain the support for with statements is also simple inside a JavaScript engine.

5. Evaluation

How effective are access permissions for detecting programming errors? To answer this question, we hand-annotated the code of several libraries and applications with contracts and ran it with monitoring enabled. We applied random code modifications to check to what extent the enforcement of access permissions detects changes in the program’s behavior.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type</th>
<th>type+effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fulfilled contracts</td>
<td>1011 18.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejected contracts</td>
<td>4607 82.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Testing random mutations for singly-linked lists.

5.1 Case Study: Singly- and Doubly-Linked Lists and Trees

The first case study examines a collection of libraries implementing data structures like singly- and doubly-linked lists and search trees. The code sizes range from 200-400 LOC per library. As the results are similar for all libraries, we discuss the singly-linked list implementation as a representative example.

The list interface comprises one constructor for list nodes and six methods to operate on a list: add, remove, item, size, toArray, and toString. For each method we developed contracts with access permissions. Annotating the code and implementing a custom contract to drive the input generation took about one hour. The code with all contracts is available on our webpage.

From the implementation we derived about 5600 random mutations and tested each mutant against the original contracts. The mutations affected operators, constants, and variable names. Each of the six functions was tested with 1000 randomly generated test cases and was run in two configurations:

- type contracts for integer lists without effects: only violations of the type contracts are detected,
- type+effect contracts for integer lists with effects: type and access path violations are detected.

Table 1 shows the results of the test runs. The “fulfilled” row counts mutations that are not detected because the mutant fulfills all six contracts. The “rejected” row registers mutants that fail at least one contract. These two rows indicate the effectiveness of effect monitoring. Adding access permissions to type contracts improves the detection rate for mutations from 82% to 87.3%, an improvement of 6.4%. The remaining rows break down the reasons for the failure of a mutant. As there are multiple functions in a mutant, there are multiple reasons why a single mutant may fail so that the percentages do not add to 100%.

We manually inspected the cases where the contract system did not detect a mutation. In many cases the mutated code is semantically equivalent to the original version, for instance, when x.p was changed to x.q, where both properties p and q were always undefined. In other cases, the contract was fulfilled by a mutant because the modification did not change any property access or return value from a type perspective, for instance, return true is changed to return false. While these mutations change the semantics, a type or access permission contract cannot detect such changes.

We also manually inspected ten randomly selected mutants that timed out. In all cases, the mutation caused an infinite loop.

5.2 Case Study: Richards and Deltablue Benchmarks

A second case study was performed on the Richards and Deltablue benchmarks from the Google V8 benchmark suite. The Richards and Deltablue benchmarks from the Google V8 benchmark suite are available on our webpage.

https://v8.googlecode.com/svn/data/benchmarks/v6/

https://github.com/nzakas/computer-science-in-javascript
benchmark simulates the task dispatcher of an operating system. The code comprises 29 functions in 650 LOC. A person without prior knowledge of the code under test provided the contracts and implemented custom generators in about four hours. It took another two hours to develop the access permissions.

Table 2 shows the result of testing about 2950 mutated versions. These tests ran executed 50 tests per function for each mutant to test for effect and contract violations. We chose to run a smaller number of tests to reduce the overall run time and to check if a small number of test cases is sufficient to obtain a high detection rate of mutants.

Adding access permissions increases the detection rate from 61.1% to 69.2%, which amounts to a 13% improvement. This increase is quite surprising as the percentages of detected read or write violations are much smaller than in the linked-list case study. In the Deltablue application (59 contracts in 670 LOC), the access permissions led to an increase in error detection from 75.6% to 84.2%, an improvement by 11.4%. In contrast to the other studies, Deltablue does not permit unit testing on a per function basis as it relies heavily on global state. Further details may be found in the appendix.

5.3 Performance Evaluation

All case studies and benchmarks were executed on a Lenovo Thinkpad X61s notebook with a Core 2 Duo processor with 1.60 GHz and 2GB Ram running the Google-Chrome browser (7.0.517.44) on top of Linux version 2.6.35-23-generic. In this setting, a test run of a mutant is about four times slower with monitoring enabled than without monitoring (in both case studies).

To give ballpark numbers, running 1000 tests for each of the six functions of the linked-list test suite takes about 6 seconds with monitoring compared to 1.5 seconds without. For Richards, running 50 tests for each of the 29 functions takes 1.85 seconds with monitoring compared to 0.5 seconds without.

For the Richards benchmark we timed the original code (without mutation) once with monitoring and once without to measure the slowdown for code that never violates the effect annotations. This experiment masks out the effects of contract violations, which cause the program to stop earlier on faulty mutants than on correct code. However, the slowdown is similar: running 1000 test cases for each of the 29 functions took 32.4 seconds with monitoring enabled versus 7.4 seconds without, a slowdown factor of 4.4.

5.4 Example Contracts for Case Studies

Figure 10 contains a representative contract for an add method that inserts an element in a binary search tree. The method adds new elements by creating a new node object that is inserted into the tree at the appropriate place. Its contract reveals that the method only reads and modifies objects reachable via this.root and then following left or right properties. It does not change the value property of any node that is already part of the tree, but it reads this data to find the place for the new node.

6. Related Work

Access permissions are closely related to effect systems. Effect systems have been conceived for functional languages [19] to describe and infer the scope of side effects, with the goal of detecting parallelizable code fragments and improving memory management.

There are too many papers on effect systems to do them all justice here. Greenhouse and Boyland [22] introduce effect annotations for Java which closely resemble our contracts. In contrast to our effect systems, effects are collected for regions which comprise a set of objects. Their approach aims to track data dependencies of software components. The main differences to our work are that most effect systems are integrated in type systems and thus geared towards static analysis (whereas ours performs dynamic analysis) and that our prime motivation lies in the detection of software defects.

The effect system proposed by Bocchino and coworkers [27] for deterministic parallel Java relies on a very similar notion of effect, based on paths over regions (sets of instance variables). They use the effect system to statically prove the absence of data races. Our system might be extended to check this property at run time.

The static verification system of Smans and coworkers [40] has a special acc predicate that helps simplifying proof obligations for the frame problem in method calls. The argument to acc is an access path similar to, but more restricted than the notion put forward in our work. A preliminary investigation suggests that their static semantics agrees with our monitoring semantics, but further work is needed to work out the exact connection.

Similarly related is work on ownership and aliasing control. Again, with the exception of the dynamic ownership system of Boyland and coworkers [6], most ownership systems statically impose tree-like ownership structures on object graphs [3] [10] [38] [45]. The main difference to ownership types is that our system is entirely access path-based whereas ownership types are context-based. Furthermore, some ownership systems forbid the mere existence of references, whereas access permissions forbid the traversal of certain paths. Effective ownership [32] does not restrict referencing of objects, but enforces the encapsulation of an object’s representation by confining modifications to the owner.

Bierhoff and Aldrich [5] define a static checker for access permissions in Java. It combines typestate and object aliasing information to design and verify protocols for safe object access. They also focus on the correct usage of single resources. Their access permissions are statically verified.

Deutsch’s [8] analysis for sharing and aliasing is also entirely based on access paths. It is a static analysis phrased as an abstract interpretation of a storeless semantics.

Run-time monitoring is an approach to providing safety and security guarantees. Erlingsson [13] provides an overview of such applications. As a notable difference, security monitoring is mostly geared towards eliminating (sequences of) uses of undesired operations and can often be implemented by finite automata, whereas access path monitoring rules out undesired accesses and requires more specific implementation techniques to deal with aliasing.

BrowserShield [19] provides run-time monitoring of JavaScript. BrowserShield rewrites code to redirect critical operations according to user-specified policies. The Google Caja project [20] em-

| Table 2. Testing random mutations of the Richards case study. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>type</th>
<th>type + effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>38.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejected contracts</td>
<td>1807</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>reason for rejection (a mutant may be counted multiple times)</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>872</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>349</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10. Contract of a binary search tree.

/ sc ... with [this.root, .left/right/**.value, this.root, /this.root, .left/right/**, .left/right/] */

BinaryTree.add = function(elem) { ... }
 employs an online compilation process of JavaScript code to a safe subset named Cajita which enforces certain security policies.

Maffeis and coworkers [35] combine several isolation techniques for restricting heap accesses of third-party code. They disallow eval, function, and constructor within untrusted code and also rewrite property accesses with wrappers to enable run-time checks. These systems operate within the browser during interactive user sessions and provide complete interposition. In contrast, our tool is focused on development and testing of applications.

Finifter and coworkers [18] design a JavaScript heap analysis framework to detect information leaks. To prevent exploits, third-party code is restricted to a name space by prefixing properties with a unique identifier. In contrast, we restrict accesses via path conditions.

ConScript [36] enforces fine-grained application-specific security policies at run time by modifying a JavaScript execution engine. Compared to our approach, they have different goals and less overhead.

Further related research deals with dynamic contract checking. Findler and Felleisen [16] develop dynamically checked type contracts for Scheme. In a similar way, JConTest [24] extends JavaScript with type contracts that are monitored dynamically and can be used to automatically generate random test cases for contracted functions. Our paper extends their work with access permissions to check side effects of a contracted function.

Program specification frameworks like Spec# [4] or Eiffel [12] permit the formulation of access permissions as FOL-formulas in Hoare-style pre- and postconditions. Because specialized syntax is missing, the annotation process is rather heavy-weight. Besides, these frameworks are geared towards full specifications, whereas we are targeting partial specifications.

JML [30] features an assignable clause to specify which object fields may be modified during a method call; similar to our write permissions (read accesses cannot be restricted). In contrast to our work, JML is mostly geared towards (static) program verification. Of the approaches that employ JML for run-time checks (that is, contract monitoring) only a few fully support assignable. Lehner and Müller [31] provide such an implementation of run-time checks. Their implementation relies on code rewriting, but the main contribution of their work is an efficient check of assignable clauses for dynamic data groups. The semantics of these checks is reminiscent of the location-based semantics discussed in Sec. 6.3.

Spoto and Poll [31] define a static analysis for object-local assignable specifications. They include alias information in their system by tracking what aliases are introduced when a field is modified. Their analysis also seems to implement the location-based semantics.

7. Conclusion

We proposed a novel extension of software contracts with access permissions that specify the side effects of an operation in terms of access paths. We implemented monitoring for access permissions in JavaScript by a program transformation and demonstrated that this implementation has an acceptable overhead. As a theoretical basis for the implementation, we developed a formalization that enabled us to cleanly specify the interaction of monitoring and aliasing, to prove soundness of monitoring, and to prove stability of violation.

Our case studies showed that the specification of contracts with access permissions on an unfamiliar code base takes about 30-40 minutes per 100 LOC and that in return the number of bugs detected by contract monitoring increases between 6% and 13%, which is a remarkable improvement on type contracts. In each case, the access permissions provided valuable insights in the behavior of the program. Hence, access permissions could be a worthwhile extension of testing frameworks.

A major design choice was the adoption of the path-based semantics because it behaves consistently with respect to static verification, it guarantees stability of violation, and it is reasonably efficient. Although single read and write accesses are more expensive than for the location-based semantics, we believe that the potentially unbounded time for installing a location-based permission is not amortized by the subsequent exploration of the object graph: We conjecture that only a small fragment of the objects affected by a contract is actually explored, but we have yet to conduct an empirical evaluation with realistic implementations of both semantics.

In future work, we want to pursue various directions. We believe that our approach is more widely applicable to any object-based language, not just to scripting languages, but also to nominally typed languages like Java and C#. In the latter cases, to avoid breaking encapsulation, it is likely necessary to introduce concepts like regions or data groups analogously to other work in this area [22][27][30]. In this context, it would also be interesting to investigate a mix of static checking and dynamic enforcement as has been done in work on manifest contracts [21].

Another obvious extension would be a special treatment for effects on the DOM [29]. Because DOM structures are guaranteed to be trees (no aliasing!), many of the complications of general object graphs do not arise in the case of DOM structures.

We further plan to investigate the location-based variant of the monitoring semantics in the context of security and access control. For this application, it appears that many of our design choices have to be reverted: for reliable monitoring of access control policies the location-based semantics with lexical scoping of permissions along with a notion of path exclusions (negative permissions) seems to be a superior approach. However, the path-based semantics can also be extended to reliably forbid access to certain objects, as shown in the appendix. In any case, a browser-based implementation of access permission monitoring is required to further validate claims in this direction.

References


Table 3. Testing random mutations of the Deltablue case study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type</th>
<th>type + effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fulfilled contracts</td>
<td>176 21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejected contracts</td>
<td>626 75.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>reason for rejection</th>
<th>signaled error</th>
<th>browser timeout</th>
<th>app exception</th>
<th>read violation</th>
<th>write violation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>505 80.7%</td>
<td>626 75.6%</td>
<td>26 4.2%</td>
<td>121 19.3%</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>469 76.6%</td>
<td>73 10.5%</td>
<td>29 4.2%</td>
<td>135 19.4%</td>
<td>20 2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Case Study: Deltablue Benchmark

For a final case study, we tested the Deltablue benchmark which is also taken from the V8 benchmark suite.\(^6\) It implements a constraint-solving algorithm for a hierarchy of objects. As a particularity, the constraint model is built by side-effects from constructors. The code implements 59 functions in 670 LOC. A person without prior knowledge of the code under test provided the contracts and implemented custom generators in about 4 hours. Here, the major complication was in reengineering the object hierarchies. The access permissions were automatically inferred and added within seconds.

Table 3 shows the result of testing about 830 mutated versions. In contrast to case studies so far, it is not possible to run unit tests for single functions or methods as the application heavily relies on global variables for storing state. Further, the major computations are triggered in the constructors of the different constraints. To test the application, we therefore utilized the actual benchmark application which consists of several test cases. The table also contains the number of exceptions that were triggered by the applications due to failed invariants in the constraint solver’s internal state.

The type of the main function is \(\text{type + effect}\). Hence it did not lead to any type contract error.

For this application, adding access permissions increased the detection rate from 75.6% to 84.2%, which amounts to a 11.37% improvement.

B. Pre-State Snapshot

Proof: (Theorem 3.1) By induction on the derivation.

The only rule requiring non-trivial reasoning is GET. By induction, we can assume that \(H'\) and \((\ell, M)\) contain correct path information. Now we have to show that the override operation creates a new correct value. Without loss of generalization, we can assume that the heap contains a reference, since otherwise the override operation is trivial. Hence, it holds that \(H'(\ell)(p) = (u, (\ell', M'))\), and the result of the heap lookup is \((\ell', M, p \oplus u N)\).

For a given arbitrary fixed time stamp \(u'\) there are now two cases:

- \(u' \in \text{dom}(N)\): In this case, the override operation picks the path from \(N\). This path is valid by induction.
- \(u' \notin \text{dom}(N)\): If \(u < u'\), the conclusion is trivial as \(M\) was path consistent. We do not need to consider the case \(u \geq u'\), because in this case the map would not be defined and the precondition of the theorem would not hold.

\(^6\) http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/data/benchmarks/v6/deltablue.js

Theorem 3.1 states the correctness of the path information, but does not yield the completeness of the gathered path information. However, it is easy to see that the system does not drop any path information. The only rule that removes paths from the system is the third case of the override operation. Due to the condition for the third case (the time stamp \(u\) is not smaller that \(u'\)) we can conclude that this case only arises if the property was written after the installation of the permit operation corresponding to the timestamp \(u\). This write operation has stored a value inside the heap which was coupled with valid path information. If the value was reachable with respect to the heap with time stamp \(u\), this path information is stored in the heap (and the first case of the override operation would trigger). The value stored in the heap by the write operation was not reachable in the heap with time stamp \(u\). Thus, it is safe to remove the path from the map. For a more formal approach to completeness see Sec. 3.3.

C. Stability of Violation

To prove Theorem 3.2, we first formulate a helping theorem.

Theorem C.1 If \(H_1 \triangleright\triangleright H_2\) and \(p_1 \triangleright\triangleright p_2\) and

\[
\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e \hookrightarrow H'_1; u'_1; v_1
\]

then either

\[
\rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e \hookrightarrow H'_2; u'_2; v_2
\]

such that there exists \(\gamma'\) extending \(\gamma\) where \(H_1 \triangleright\triangleright H_2\) and \(u'_1 = u'_2\) and \(v'_1 \triangleright\triangleright v'_2\) or

\[
\rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e \not\hookrightarrow O
\]

such that the derivation of \(\delta\) ends in an inconsistent read operation with respect to \(\delta\).

Proof: (Theorem C.1) By induction on the derivation of \(\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e \hookrightarrow H''_1; u''_1; v_1\) for any set \(X\) of variables.

Case App, \(e \equiv e_0(e_1)\):

\[
\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e_0(e_1) \hookrightarrow H''_1; u''_1; v_1
\]

By induction on \(\delta\), we obtain that either \(e_0\) crashes on \(H_2\) (which would make the whole application crash) or \(\rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e_0 \hookrightarrow H''_2; u''_2; v_2\) where, for some extension \(\gamma'\) of \(\gamma\), \(H'_1 \triangleright\triangleright H''_2\) and \(v'_1 \triangleright\triangleright v''_2\).

By induction on \(\delta\), we obtain that either \(e_1\) crashes on \(H_2\) (which would make the whole application crash) or \(\rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e_1 \hookrightarrow H''_2; u''_1; v_2\) where, for some extension \(\gamma'\) of \(\gamma\), \(H''_1 \triangleright\triangleright H''_2\) and \(v'_1 \triangleright\triangleright v''_2\).

By induction on \(\delta\), we obtain that either \(e'\) crashes on \(H_2\) (which would make the whole application crash) or \(\rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e' \hookrightarrow H''_2; u''; v_2\)
where, for some extension \( \gamma'' \) of \( \gamma' \), \( H''_1 \succsim \gamma'' \) and \( H''_2 \succsim \gamma'' \) and \( v_1 \succsim \gamma'' \) \( v_2 \).

Hence, rule \textsc{app} yields

\[
\rho, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e; e' (e_1) \rightarrow H'_2; u''; v_2
\]

where, for some extension \( \gamma'' \) of \( \gamma \), \( H''_1 \succsim \gamma'' \) and \( H''_2 \succsim \gamma'' \) and \( v_1 \succsim \gamma'' \) \( v_2 \).

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Case new, } \( e \equiv \text{new} : \)
    \[
    \rho, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e; \text{new} \rightarrow H_1[(\ell_1 \mapsto \varnothing); u; (\ell_1, 0)] \\
    \text{where } \ell_1 \notin \text{dom}(H_1)
    \]
    Clearly, there exists \( \ell_2 \notin \text{dom}(H_2) \) so that \text{new} is applicable to \( H_2 \).

\item \textbf{Case get, } \( e \equiv e'.p : \)
    \[
    \rho, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e'.p \rightarrow H_1'; u'; v_1
    \]
    because
    \[
    \rho, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e' \rightarrow H'_1; u'; (\ell_1, M_1) \quad (9)
    \]
    \[
    R \vdash_{\text{app}} M_1.p \quad (10)
    \]
    where \( v_1' = M_1.p \oplus H'_1(\ell_1)(p) \).

\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \text{Induction on } (\text{app-crash}) \text{ yields that either } e' \text{ crashes on } H_2 \text{ (making the whole evaluation crash via \text{get-crash})}
  \item \text{or } \rho, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e' \rightarrow H'_2; u'(\ell_2, M_2)
    \text{ where } H_2' \succsim \gamma'' \text{ and } (\ell_1, M_1) \succsim \gamma'' \text{ (for some } \gamma' \text{ extending } \gamma).
    \text{That means } \ell_2 = \gamma'(\ell_1) \text{ and } M_1 = M_2. \text{ The latter implies }
    \[
    R \vdash_{\text{app}} M_2.p
    \]
    and it remains to consider \( v_2' = M_2.p \oplus H'_2(\ell_2)(p) \).
    \end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \text{Let } (u_1, v_1) = H'_1(\ell_1)(p) \text{ and } (u_2, v_2) = H'_2(\ell_2)(p).
    \item \text{If } u_1 = u_2, \text{ then } H'_1 \succsim \gamma' \text{ implies } v_1 \succsim \gamma' \text{ and further implies } \gamma''(u_2).
    \item \text{If } u_1 < u_2, \text{ then this read operation is inconsistent with respect to } H'_1 \succsim \gamma' \text{ and we choose the non-deterministic error exit by continuing the derivation with rule \text{get-crash3}.}
    \end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Case put, } \( e \equiv p : \)
    \[
    \rho, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e' = e_2 \rightarrow H'_1; u''; v_1'
    \]
    because
    \[
    \rho, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e' \rightarrow H'_1; u'; (\ell_1, M_1) \quad (11)
    \]
    \[
    \rho, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e' \rightarrow H'_1; u'; (\ell_2, M_2) \quad (12)
    \]
    \[
    W \vdash_{\text{app}} M_1.p \quad (13)
    \]
    \[
    H''_1 = H''_1[\ell_1 \mapsto H''_1(\ell_2)[p \mapsto (u'', v_1)]] \quad (14)
    \]
    \[
    u''' = u'' + 1 \quad (15)
    \]
    By induction on \( (11) \), we have that either \rho, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e_1 \equiv\)
    \text{or } \rho, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e'_2 \rightarrow H'_2; u''; (\ell_2, M_2)
    \text{ such that } H_2' \succsim \gamma' \text{ and } \ell_2 = \gamma'(\ell_1), \text{ for some extension } \gamma' \text{ of } \gamma'.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \text{In the latter case, we continue by induction on } (12). \text{ We have that either } \rho, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e_2 \equiv\)
    \text{or } \rho, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e'_2 \rightarrow H'_2; u'; v_2'
    \text{ such that } H'_2 \succsim \gamma'_2 \text{ and } \ell_2 = \gamma'(\ell_1), \text{ for some extension } \gamma' \text{ of } \gamma'.

\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \text{In the latter case, } W \vdash_{\text{app}} M_2.p \text{ because } M_1 = M_2 \text{ and it remains to show that }
    \[
    H''_1[\ell_1 \mapsto H''_1(\ell_2)[p \mapsto (u'', v_1)]] \succsim \gamma' \text{ and } H''_2[\ell_2 \mapsto H''_2(\ell_2)[p \mapsto (u'', v_2)]]
    \]
    \end{itemize}
which is clear from the definition: we are overwriting one property in one object in a way that the time stamps are identical and with related values.

Hence, rule put is applicable to complete the derivation.

Case permit, \(e \equiv \text{permit } x : L_r, L_w \in e'\):

Given that, \(\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e \equiv (\perp, M) [T', T'']\)

\[\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e \equiv (\perp, M) [T', T'\]\n
\[\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e \equiv (\perp, M) [T', T''\]

Proof: (Theorem 14) By induction on the derivation of \(\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e \equiv e'\).

The proof relies on Theorem C 10 to handle all non-crashing subcomputations. Hence, the induction only handles the crashing rules in Fig. 11.

It is interesting to observe that the \(\triangleright^O\) outcome only arises due to subcomputations that did not crash in \(H_1\). So they are only generated by invocations of Theorem C 10 not by cases handled directly in this proof.

Case app-crash1, \(e \equiv e_0(e_1)\):

Immediate by appeal to the induction hypothesis.

Case app-crash2, \(e \equiv e_0(e_1)\):

By inversion of rule app-crash2, we obtain

\[\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e_0 \equiv H_2'; u'; (\rho_1', \lambda x. e')\] (18)

By Theorem C 10 applied to (18), we obtain either

\[\rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e_0 \equiv H_2'; u'; (\rho_2', \lambda x. e')\]

in which case we complete the derivation with rule app-crash1, or

\[\rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e_0 \equiv H_2'; u'; (\rho_2', \lambda x. e')\]

where \(H_1' \triangleright^\gamma H_2'\) and \(\rho_1' \triangleright^\gamma \rho_2'\) for some \(\gamma'\) extending \(\gamma\).

Thus, we can apply induction to (19) to obtain

\[\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e_1 \triangleright^\gamma\]

with the stated relation between \(i\) and \(j\). Applying app-crash2 completes the derivation.

Case app-crash3, \(e \equiv e_0(e_1)\):

Analogous to case app-crash2.

Case get-crash1, \(e \equiv e_0' \cdot p\):

Analogous to case app-crash1.

Case get-crash2, \(e \equiv e_0' \cdot p\):

By inversion, we obtain

\[\rho_1, R, W \vdash H_1; u; e' \equiv H_1'; u'; (e_1, M_1)\] (20)

\[\rho_1, R_{\downarrow} M_{\downarrow}, M_2, p\] (21)

As in previous cases, either

\[\rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e' \equiv (\perp, M_2)\]

which gets propagated or

\[\rho_2, R, W \vdash H_2; u; e' \equiv (\perp, M_2)\]

where \(H_1' \triangleright^\gamma H_2'\) and \(\rho_1' \triangleright^\gamma \rho_2'\) and \(e_2 = \gamma'(e_1)\) and

\[M_1 = M_2\] for some \(\gamma'\) extending \(\gamma\).

Hence, \(R_{\downarrow} M_{\downarrow}, M_2, p\) and an application of get-crash2 concludes the derivation.

Case get-crash3: is not applicable.

Cases put-crash1, put-crash2, put-crash3, permit-crash:

Analogous to previous cases. □

D. Tracing Soundness

This section does not have a corresponding part in the paper. But the facts we prove here are interesting on its own. The result underlines that our semantics adheres to the pre-state snapshot principle (Sec. 2). Informally, suppose an access contract is attached to a variable holding a reference \(\ell\) to some object. Then we want to make sure that if an object at \(\ell'\) is accessed via this variable without triggering a violation, then there is a path sanctioned by the contract from \(\ell\) to \(\ell'\) in the pre-state of the contract installation.

To formulate a precise statement, we extend the evaluation judgment to trace all read and write accesses in sets \(T', T'' \subseteq \text{Loci} \times \text{Props}\):

\[\rho, R, W \vdash H; u; e \equiv H'; u'; v [T', T'']\]

Figure 12 shows the modified rules for property read and write; the remaining rules just union the trace sets from the subcomputations as shown in the put' rule.

We further need to refer to all heap locations reachable from a given object location. This notion is formalized with a mapping \(\text{reach} : \text{Heap} \times \text{Val} \rightarrow \wp(\text{Loci})\), which returns the set of locations that are reachable from an input value \(v\) by dereferencing along any path \(\pi \in \text{Path}\), using the auxiliary function \(\downarrow\) (see Figure 13). This function is heavily overloaded, but it just distributes the work. The first case accepts a set of paths and unions the results of each path. The second case accepts the result of a property read, a pair of a time stamp \(u\) and a value \(v\), and returns the result for the value. The third case returns \(\emptyset\) if the value is not a reference. Otherwise, it leaves the actual dereferencing to function \(\downarrow\). The function \(\downarrow\) is driven by its path argument. If the path is empty, it returns the object reached. Otherwise, it dereferences the first step in the path continuing with \(\downarrow\), case 2.

The acc function yields pairs of locations and property names for all accessible properties along a path \(\pi \in \Pi\). These pairs express “last steps” (\(U, p\)) in an access path \(\pi, p\): \(\ell'\) is the object reachable by path \(\pi\) and \(p\) is the property to be accessed. The first equation extends the function to sets of paths by joining the results on individual paths. The second equation deals with a reference value by dereferencing all steps of a path except the last one and pairing the resulting location with the last step of the path. The third equation handles a non-reference value.

The following theorem states the essence of the pre-state snapshot principle. To avoid excessive formal machinery, the statement is formulated in a setting where the variable to which the contract is attached refers to a part of the heap that is not reachable from other parts of the heap.
The second assumption just says that $\rho_{Lacc}$ results (at most one) with $v$ and $v_{1}$, $v_{2}$, and $v_{3}$. The theorem clearly implies that accesses or modifications to $H$ and $v$ are p.r. But that means, if $u_{x} \in dom(M)$ then $\ell \in \psi(H, v, \pi)$. It remains to show that $M.p \cup H'(\ell)(p)$ is p.r. The only interesting case occurs if $H'(\ell)(p) = (u, (v', \ell', \pi))$, in which case the returned value is $M.p \cup (u, (v', \ell', \pi)) = (\ell', M.p \cup u, N).$

If $u_{x} \notin dom(N)$, then the heap location has changed its content since the access permission associated with $u_{x}$ and it has been overwritten with a value reachable in $H_{0}$ from $x$ on path $\mathcal{N}(u_{x})$. This path annotation has to stay in force to ensure p.r. of the result: $(M.p \cup \mathcal{N}(u_{x}))|(u_{x}) = (\mathcal{N}(u_{x}))|(u_{x})$, for which p.r. holds by the inductive assumption.

If $u_{x} \notin dom(N)$, then the contents of the heap location has not yet been reached from $\ell_{x}$. There are two cases, which can be distinguished by comparing $u$ and $u_{x}$. If $u \leq u_{x}$, then the heap location has not changed since $H_{0}$ and the result can be marked as visited. This is expressed by $(M.p \cup \mathcal{N}(u_{x}))|(u_{x}) = (M.p \cup u, \mathcal{N}(u_{x})$. By the property read that happens in this rule, it is clear that $\ell' \in \psi(H, v', \mathcal{N}(u_{x})) = \psi(H, v', \mathcal{N}(u_{x}))$. If, however, $u > u_{x}$, then the heap location has changed since $H_{0}$, but the new value has not been reachable from $\ell_{x}$ in $H_{0}$. For that reason, the value must not receive a $u_{x}$ annotation. This is expressed by $(M.p \cup \mathcal{N}(u_{x}))|(u_{x}) = undefined$.

Case put: by induction $H'$ and $(\ell, M)$ are p.r. Hence, $H''$ and $V$ are also p.r. by induction. So is the final heap as the rule overwrites a value with a p.r. value.

**Case permit:** immediate by induction. □

Towards the proof of Theorem D.1 which is by induction on the evaluation judgment with traces, we observe that the top-level judgment “seeds” the lemma in a non-trivial way. The environment $\rho[x] \Rightarrow \rho(x) \in [u_{x} \Rightarrow v]$ is p.r. with respect to $u_{x}$, $\ell_{x}$, and $H_{0}$ (from (22)) because $\ell_{x} \in \psi(H_{0}, u_{x}, v)$ and no other environment entry refers to $u_{x}$. Similarly, the heap $H_{0}$ is p.r. because does not contain any reference to $u_{x}$. Thus, the lemma tells us that $H_{1}$ and $v$ are also p.r.
E. Application to Security

For a security scenario, consider that Web browsers maintain a number of “magic properties” where an assignment causes a significant change of the browser’s state (for example, `window.location`) or where a read operation may unveil sensitive information of the user (for example, `document.cookie`). Wrapping a monitored contract around a suspicious piece of code can easily reveal and prevent this kind of problem.

As discussed with the example in Sec. 2.1, neither the location-based semantics nor the path-based one can guarantee that a property like `window.location` is never accessed. However, there are extensions to both semantics that grant reliable write protection for `window.location`. For the path-based semantics, it requires applying a contract to the `window` object at the beginning of the program run before any alias is taken.

A typical attacker model for JavaScript considers untrustworthy code that is loaded at run time to enhance one’s program with some sought-after functionality. The lack of a proper module system or encapsulation mechanism in JavaScript means that the attacker’s code can arbitrarily explore and modify any accessible object. This freedom is undesirable because the code may leak or change sensitive information contained in some of the objects, for example, the browser history, session cookies, the currently displayed page, inputs into a web form, and so on.

(Contagious) Access permission contracts with the path-based semantics can ensure that certain parts of the object graph are never accessed after extending the monitoring framework as follows: When starting a script, an implicit permission is installed for the roots of all sensitive information. Typically, we would install the permission `window.*`, which enables read and write access to all transitive properties of the `window` object. Effectively, this permission covers all objects accessible to a JavaScript program.

The novelty of the extension is that the installation of this permission returns a handle, say `window.handle`, that allows us to later restrict the permission by removing access paths from it. For example, we would invoke an untrusted function through a permission wrapper like the following to keep it from changing the location property of the `window` object.

```javascript
/* (c) () \rightarrow any with [...] except [window.handle.location] */

function untrusted_wrapper() {

  untrusted();
}
```

This way, a program can explicitly manage the trust invested in a foreign code fragment.

The installation of such an exception would still take constant time, as the implementation only needs to enter the exception into the permission map for `window.handle`. Also the cost of checking a permission remains linear in the number of installed permissions.

In the formal system, the `permit` expression would change to `permit x as y : L_r, L_w in e` where the execution additionally binds `y` to the time stamp under which the permission for `x` is installed. A new expression `restrict y : L_r, L_w in e` removes the permissions `L_r` and `L_w` from `R(u)` and `W(u)` when `y` is bound to `u`. Details may be found in Sec.

Our implementation already supports the `except` clause with a slightly different semantics, but it does not provide permission handles, yet. We are currently working on this addition as a proof of concept, but in the long run we aim for a browser-based implementation. The transformation-based implementation is sufficient for the applications related to program understanding and testing, but for the security application, the implementation must take place inside the browser. A browser-based implementation is less brittle than a transformation-based implementation, it imposes less runtime overhead on the program execution, and it is able to fully deal with the dynamicity of JavaScript, in particular with the frequent uses of `eval` and with the dynamic loading of parts of the program in various ways.

Extending the location-based semantics for security applications also requires the introduction of an `except` clause. Processing such a clause would give rise to yet another traversal of the object graph, but this time removing permissions rather than joining them.
F. Location-Based Semantics

The idea of the location-based semantics is to assign read or write permissions to the properties of a set of locations that is determined by a particular access permission. To do that safely requires a partial traversal of the object graph for the installation of each access permission.

This section contains the outline of an implementation that requires two main data structures and that relies on the instrumentation of all operations that affect the heap: creation of new objects, reading a property, and writing a property.

Both of the two data structures are stacks. They have one entry for each currently installed access permission. The top entry contains the information for the most recently installed permission.

newlocs : Stack of (Set of Location)

The top entry contains the newly allocated locations since the last active permission was installed. All stack entries are disjoint.

The rationale for this data structure is that newly allocated locations are not governed by previously installed permissions. Therefore, the program is free to read and write to their properties.

The top entry contains the currently active permissions. The map on top of the stack is always less permissive than the map below on the intersection of the domains of the two maps. The map on top never contains locations in top(newlocs).

These definitions are sufficient to define the instrumentation of the code. The notation \( S[l][p] \) addresses the object store at location \( l \) and property \( p \).

// replacement for read operation
function read (l : Location, p : Property) {
    if (getPermission(l, p) >= Readable) {
        return \( S[l][p] \);
    } else {
        throw ReadViolation;
    }
}

// replacement for write operation
function write (l : Location, p : Property, x : Any) {
    if (getPermission(l, p) >= Writable) {
        \( S[l][p] = x; \)
    } else {
        throw WriteViolation;
    }
}

// replacement for new
function new() {
    l = some location not in \( \text{dom}(S) \);
    \( S[l] = \text{empty object} \);
    top (newlocs) = top (newlocs) \cup \{ l \};
}

Computing the access permission amounts to first checking if the location is new, in which case reading and writing is permitted, and then look it up in the permissions stack.

function getPermission (l : Location, p : Property) {
    if (l in top(newlocs)) return Writable;
    return top (permissions) (l, p);
}

The remaining procedures implement the installation of a permission contract as shown in Sec. [1] and [2]. It contains the extensions for path exceptions as mentioned in Sec. [3].

A permission is a Mealy machine \( M = (S, S_0, \Sigma, \Lambda, \delta, \lambda) \) where \( S \) is the set of finite states, \( \Sigma = \text{Property} \) is the input alphabet, \( \Lambda = \text{Permission} \) is the output alphabet, \( \delta : S \times \Sigma \rightarrow S \) is the transition function and \( \lambda : S \times \Sigma \rightarrow \Lambda \) is the output function. Thus, an access permission is a regular set of access paths.

function installPermission {
    permissionsToGrant : List of (Location \times \text{MealyMachine})
    permissionsToRevoke : List of (Location \times \text{MealyMachine})
    
    newPerm = new EmptyPermission();
    
    for ((l, M) in permissionsToGrant)
        permitPaths (newPerm, l, M);
    
    for ((l, M) in permissionsToRevoke)
        forbidPaths (newPerm, l, M);
    
    push (permissions, newPerm);
    push (newlocs, \emptyset);
}

Uninstalling a permission (i.e., leaving its extent) happens in two steps. First, the most recently installed permissions/restrictions are withdrawn. Second, the newly allocated locations are joined.

function uninstallPermission () {
    pop (permissions);
    newLocSinceInstallation = pop (newlocs);
    top (newlocs) = union (top (newlocs), newLocSinceInstallation);
}

Defining new read and write permissions refines the existing permissions. Accesses that were forbidden before cannot be granted by installing a new permission. Computation of permissions traverses the object graph starting from the base object (using the function adjustPaths). The function permit ensures that each adjustment increases the entries in newPerm, but keeps it below the entry in the top element of the permission stack.

function permitPaths (newPerm, l, M) {
    function permit(newPerm, l, p, permission) {
        newPerm(l, p) = min ( getPermission(l, p),
            max( newPerm(l, p), permission));
    }
    adjustPaths (permit, M, newPerm, l, M, S_0, \emptyset);
}

Installing new exceptions is analogous to installing permissions. It must be applied after granting permissions as shown in installPermission. If permission is Writeable, forbid reduces the permission to at most Readable. If permission is Readable, the permission for the property of the object is removed completely.

function forbidPaths (newPerm, l, M) {
    function forbid(newPerm, l, p, permission) {
        if (permission == Writeable) {
            newPerm(l, p) = min ( newPerm(l, p), Readable);
        } else if (permission == Readable) {
            newPerm(l, p) = None;
        }
    }
    adjustPaths (forbid, M, newPerm, l, M, S_0, \emptyset);
}

The function adjustPaths traverses the heap based on the permission set and calls the \( \text{pSetter} \) function to adjust newPerm.

// install/remove for an automata M on location l
function adjustPaths (pSetter, M, newPerm, l, s, cache) {
    if ((l,s) in cache) return;
    cache := cache \cup \{ (l,s) \};
    for (p in properties(l)) {
        if (M.(s,p) \neq None) pSetter(newPerm, l, p, M.(s,p));
        adjustPaths(pSetter, M, newPerm, S[l][p], M.(s,p), cache);
    }
}
G. Further Examples

G.1 Introduction

An access contract explicitly states the set of paths (sequences of property accesses) that a method may access from the objects in scope. Being able to state such contracts is important in a language like JavaScript, where a side effect is the raison d'être of many operations. To support this claim, consider the following code:

```javascript
function redirectTo (url) {
    window.location = url;
}
```

The type-signature contract (string) \(\rightarrow\) undefined would be suitable for redirect, stating that the argument must be a string and that the undefined result value should be returned. However, the interesting information about the function is that it changes the location property of the window object, which has the further effect of redirecting the web browser to a new page. To specify this effect, our extended contract language enables us to extend the above contract with an access permission:

... with [window.location]

This extended contract allows the function to access and modify the location property of window but denies access to any other object. Contract monitoring for such a contract enforces the permission at runtime. For example, if the function’s implementation above were replaced by

```javascript
function redirectTo (url) {
    window.location = url;
    myhistory.push (url);
}
```

while keeping the same type signature and access permission, then monitoring would report a contract violation as soon as the function accesses the data structure myhistory.

G.2 Modular Layout Computation

Suppose you are a JavaScript developer who has just been assigned a maintenance task on a large AJAX application. In particular, you need to work on the code that performs a layout computation for a bunch of view objects. To start with, it would be advantageous to know which properties are modified by the code. Using our framework, a developer can gradually specify access contracts for the code until it runs without contract violation on a sufficiently large number of test cases. For example, the final specification may be as follows:

```javascript
/*c \{\}, (int, int) \rightarrow boolean with [this.x, this.y, this.w, this.h] */
Frame.prototype.layout = function (width, height) { ... }
```

The special comment /*c ... */ specifies a contract for a method. The part before with defines the type signature. In the subsequent access permission, this refers to the receiver object of the method call. The access paths specify that only properties named x,y, w, or h of the receiver object may be written.

An access path starts with any variable name in scope followed by a sequence of property names. It permits reading any property reachable by dereferencing some prefix of the access path and writing the properties reachable by dereferencing the entire access path. The special variable names this, $1, $2, … refer to the receiver object of a method call and to the first, second, and so on parameter. They are synonymous to the respective parameter name.

G.3 Read-only Objects

Many libraries rely on a programming pattern to define JavaScript functions with keyword parameters. The idea is to define a function with one parameter which is always an object. The properties of this object play the role of keyword parameters as in this example:

```javascript
c = createCanvas({width: 100, height: 200, background: "green"});
```

As it is generally considered bad programming style to assign to parameters, this parameter object should not be changed, either. Such changes could be forbidden with a contract:

```javascript
/*c \{\} \rightarrow undefined with [\$1.*.\@] */
```

This specification uses two new features in the access permission: as in name patterns for file access in a shell, the \(*\) stands for any sequence of property names. The final \(@\) stands for the empty set of property names. Thus, the first parameter must be read-only. Read permission is granted for all properties reachable from \$1, but write permission is granted only for those access paths that end in a property name that is contained in the empty set, that is, for no access path.

G.4 Observer

In an implementation of the observer pattern, the programmer would like to make sure that an observer only reads and writes properties below the state component of the subject. This restriction may be expressed with the contract

```javascript
/*c \{\} \rightarrow any with [\$1.state.*.\@] */
Observer.prototype.update = function (subject) {
    ... subject.state.value = ...
}
```

With this access permission, any property below state is readable and writable but state itself is read-only. The final \@ stands for any property name.

G.5 Regular Expression Permissions

Let’s return to the example from the introduction, where we wanted to ensure that a method only accesses and modifies the `window.location` property. In the context of enforcement of security properties, it is more likely that we want to forbid access to a few chosen properties, whereas we do not care about accesses to the majority of properties. In such a situation, we might write an access permission like the following:

```javascript
... with [window./*\{(?!status$1)\}$/] ...
```

It specifies an access path that accepts read and write accesses only to properties of the `window` object that match the regular expression enclosed in slashes. The particular regular expression in the example matches all property names different from status. Often, such cases are easier to express with our syntax for revoking permissions, as in

```javascript
... with [window.?] except [window.status,window.location]
```

which forbids accessing the status and location properties. Revocation is only possible for permissions granted in the same contract.

\(^7\) undefined is a special value in JavaScript. Methods without an explicit return statement return undefined.
H. Syntax and Semantics of Effects

The implementation requires access permissions to be specified using the path notation informally introduced in Sec. C. We first present a formalization of this notation, which we then connect to the actual syntax used in the implementation.

Figure 14 presents the formal syntax of access permissions. An access permission classifies access paths $\pi$, which are sequences of property names. Access paths are classified as read paths, write paths, or negative paths by writing $R(\pi)$, $W(\pi)$, or $N(\pi)$. An access permission is built from path permissions with set union and difference operators. A path permission $b$ is either empty, a path step $P$ followed by a permission, or an iterated path step $P$ followed by a permission. $P$ can be an arbitrary set of property names.

Figure 15 defines the semantics of access permissions with inference rules for the judgment $\kappa \prec a$, which indicates that the classified path $\kappa$ matches permission $a$. Essentially, a single path step $P$ in a permission is matched by a corresponding property $p \in P$ in the path. An iterated path step $P\ast$ is matched by a sequence of properties from $P$ in the path. The three axioms on top of Fig. 15 implement the different treatment of the three kinds of path. A write path must be matched exactly by the permission, a read path may match any prefix of the permission, and a negative path only requires that a path prefix is matched by the permission. The latter choice is required for the implementation of the difference operator $a_1 - a_2$, where the second premise asks for $N(\pi) \not\prec a_2$, that is, there should be no derivation of $N(\pi) \prec a_2$. This definition enforces that the read language is prefix closed as well as the connection between the write and read languages mentioned in Sec. 3.1.

Turning to the concrete syntax, an access permission for a variable $x$ has the following general form:

$$\text{with } [x.w_1, \ldots, x.w_n] \text{ except } [x.e_1, \ldots, x.e_m]$$

Translated to the formal syntax defined in Figure 14 this permission reads as follows:

$$a = (w_1 + \ldots + w_n) - e_1 - \ldots - e_m .$$

The access permission (23) corresponds to the language $L_x = \{ \pi \mid R(\pi) \prec a \}$ of permitted read paths and the language $L_w = \{ \pi \mid W(\pi) \prec a \}$ of permitted write paths for the variable $x$. Hence, adding a contract with an effect annotation to a function as in (23) is equivalent to surrounding the function body $e$ with the permit expression $\text{permit } x : L_x, L_w \text{ in } e$.

As in the formal syntax, paths of arbitrary length can be specified using the $\ast$ operator. For example, an access permission for $x, x.next, x.next.next, \ldots$ for the elements of a list is written as $x.next\ast$. The wildcard property ? stands for the set of all property names. If the operator $\ast$ is used without a preceding property name, then it stands for $\ast 1$, specifying a sequence of arbitrary property names.

A property set can be specified in several ways. An identifier (as in x.test) or a string literal ("x":"foo.bar") specify singleton sets, with the string notation allowing special characters (like .) in property names. A regular expression ("x.left/right") specifies the set of properties that match the expression.

The implementation supports two further extensions. Regular expressions may also be used on the access path level:

$$x.(left|right)\ast.data/$$

Further, it is possible to register a JavaScript callback to describe the path language in terms of JavaScript code. For example, the function f is called to test membership of a path in the language if the permission is f.$f$.

- $p \in \text{Prop}$
- $\pi ::= \varepsilon | p,\pi$
- $\gamma ::= R | W | N$
- $P \subseteq \text{Prop}$
- $b ::= \varepsilon | P.b | p \ast b$
- $a ::= \emptyset | b + a | a - b$
- $? = \text{Prop}, \varepsilon = \emptyset \subseteq \text{Prop}, \ast = \emptyset$

**Figure 14.** Syntax of access paths and access permissions.

- $W(\varepsilon) \prec \varepsilon$
- $R(\varepsilon) \prec b$
- $N(\pi) \prec \varepsilon$
- $\gamma(\pi) \prec b$
- $p \in P$
- $\gamma(p,\pi) \prec P.b$
- $\gamma(\pi) \prec P \ast b$
- $\gamma(\pi, p) \prec P \ast b$
- $\kappa \prec a_1$
- $\kappa \prec a_2$
- $\gamma(\pi) \prec a_1$
- $N(\pi) \not\prec a_2$
- $\gamma(\pi) \prec a_1 - a_2$
- $\forall \kappa \in K \kappa \prec a$
- $K \prec a$

**Figure 15.** Matching paths with access permissions.