

Softwaretechnik

Design by Contract



Software Engineering
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- Contracts for object-oriented programs
- Contract monitoring
- Program verification
- Automatic program verification

Road Map

- Contracts for object-oriented programs

Recall: Contracts for Procedural Programs

- Goal: Specification of imperative procedures
- Approach: give **assertions** about the procedure (**contract**)
 - Precondition
 - must be true on entry
 - ensured by caller of procedure
 - Postcondition
 - must be true on exit
 - ensured by procedure **if it terminates**
- **Precondition**(*State*) \Rightarrow **Postcondition**(**procedure**(*State*))
- Notation: **{Precondition} procedure {Postcondition}**
- Assertions stated in first-order predicate logic

```
class TABLE {
  int capacity; // size of table
  int count; // number of elements in table
  T get (String key) {...}
  void insert (T element, String key);
}
```

Insert an element in a table of fixed size

Precondition: table is not full

$$\text{count} < \text{capacity}$$

Postcondition: new element in table, count updated

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{count} \leq \text{capacity} \\ \wedge & \text{ get}(\text{key}) = \text{element} \\ \wedge & \text{ count} = \text{old count} + 1 \end{aligned}$$

- Subclass may override a method definition
- Effect on specification:
 - Subclass may have different invariant
 - Redefined methods may
 - have different pre- and postconditions
 - raise different exceptions
 - ⇒ method specialization
- Relation to invariant and pre-, postconditions in base class?
- Main guideline: **No surprises requirement** (Wing, FMOODS 1997)
Properties that users rely on to hold of an object of type T should hold even if the object is actually a member of a subtype S of T .

Invariant of a Subclass

```
class MYTABLE extends TABLE ...
```

- each property expected of a TABLE object should also be granted by a MYTABLE object
 - if o has type MYTABLE then INV_{TABLE} must hold for o
- ⇒ $INV_{\text{MYTABLE}} \Rightarrow INV_{\text{TABLE}}$
- Example: MYTABLE might be a hash table with invariant

$$INV_{\text{MYTABLE}} \equiv \text{count} \leq \text{capacity}/3$$

Method Specialization

If MYTABLE redefines insert then ...

- the new precondition must be weaker and
- the new postcondition must be stronger

because in

```
TABLE cast = new MYTABLE (150);
...
cast.insert (new Terminator (3), "Arnie");
```

the caller

- guarantees only $\text{Pre}_{\text{insert, TABLE}}$
- expects $\text{Post}_{\text{insert, TABLE}}$

Suppose class T defines method m with assertions $\mathbf{Pre}_{T,m}$ and $\mathbf{Post}_{T,m}$ throwing exceptions $\mathbf{Exc}_{T,m}$. If class S extends class T and redefines m then the redefinition is a [sound method specialization](#) if

- $\mathbf{Pre}_{T,m} \Rightarrow \mathbf{Pre}_{S,m}$ and
- $\mathbf{Post}_{S,m} \Rightarrow \mathbf{Post}_{T,m}$ and
- $\mathbf{Exc}_{S,m} \subseteq \mathbf{Exc}_{T,m}$
each exception thrown by $S.m$ may also be thrown by $T.m$

- $\mathbf{Pre}_{\text{MYTABLE.insert}} \equiv \text{count} < \text{capacity}/3$
not a sound method specialization because it is not implied by $\text{count} < \text{capacity}$.
- MYTABLE may automatically resize the table, so that $\mathbf{Pre}_{\text{MYTABLE.insert}} \equiv \mathbf{true}$ a sound method specialization because $\text{count} < \text{capacity} \Rightarrow \mathbf{true}$!
- Suppose MYTABLE adds a new instance variable T `lastInserted` that holds the last value inserted into the table.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Post}_{\text{MYTABLE.insert}} \equiv & \text{get}(\text{key}) = \text{element} \\ & \wedge \text{count} = \mathbf{old} \text{ count} + 1 \\ & \wedge \text{lastInserted} = \text{element} \end{aligned}$$

is sound method specialization because $\mathbf{Post}_{\text{MYTABLE.insert}} \Rightarrow \mathbf{Post}_{\text{TABLE.insert}}$

Road Map

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Road Map

- Contract monitoring

- What happens if a system's execution violates an assertion at run time?
- A violating execution runs outside the system's specification.
- The system's reaction may be **arbitrary**
 - crash
 - continue
 - **contract monitoring**: evaluate assertions at runtime and raise an exception indicating any violation
- Why monitor?
 - Debugging (with different levels of monitoring)
 - Software fault tolerance (e.g., α and β releases)

- precondition**: evaluate assertion on entry
identifies problem in the caller
- postcondition**: evaluate assertion on exit
identifies problem in the callee
- invariant**: evaluate assertion on entry and exit
problem in the callee's class
- hierarchy**: unsound method specialization
need to check (for all superclasses T of S)
 - $\text{Pre}_{T,m} \Rightarrow \text{Pre}_{S,m}$ on entry and
 - $\text{Post}_{S,m} \Rightarrow \text{Post}_{T,m}$ on exit
 how?

Hierarchy Checking

Suppose class S extends T and overrides a method m .
Let $x = \text{new } S()$ and consider $x.m()$

- on entry
 - if $\text{Pre}_{T,m}$ holds, then $\text{Pre}_{S,m}$ must hold, too
 - $\text{Pre}_{S,m}$ must hold
- on exit
 - $\text{Post}_{S,m}$ must hold
 - if $\text{Post}_{S,m}$ holds, then $\text{Post}_{T,m}$ must hold, too
- in general: cascade of implications between S and T

Examples

```
interface IConsole {
    int getMaxSize();
    @post { getMaxSize > 0 }
    void display (String s);
    @pre { s.length () < this.getMaxSize() }
}

class Console implements IConsole {
    int getMaxSize () { ... }
    @post { getMaxSize > 0 }
    void display (String s) { ... }
    @pre { s.length () < this.getMaxSize() }
```

```

class RunningConsole extends Console {
  void display (String s) {
    ...
    super.display
      (String.substring (s, ..., ... + getMaxSize()))
    ...
  }
  @pre { true }
}

```

```

class PrefixedConsole extends Console {
  String getPrefix() {
    return ">> ";
  }
  void display (String s) {
    super.display (this.getPrefix() + s);
  }
  @pre { s.length() <
        this.getMaxSize() - this.getPrefix().length() }
}

```

- caller may only guarantee IConsole's precondition
- blame the programmer of PrefixedConsole!

- Assertions can be arbitrary side effect-free boolean expressions
- Monitoring can only prove the presence of violations, not their absence
- Absence of violations can only be guaranteed by formal verification

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- Program verification

- Given: Specification of imperative **procedure** by **Precondition** and **Postcondition**
- Goal: Formal proof for **Precondition(State) \Rightarrow Postcondition(procedure(State))**
- Method: **Hoare Logic**, i.e., a proof system for **Hoare triples** of the form

$$\{\text{Precondition}\} \text{ procedure } \{\text{Postcondition}\}$$

- named after C.A.R. Hoare, the inventor of Quicksort, CSP, and many other
- here: method bodies, no recursion, no pointers (extensions exist)

Syntax

E, F	$::= c \mid x \mid E + F \mid \dots$	expressions
B, P, Q	$::= \neg B \mid P \wedge Q \mid P \vee Q$ $E = F \mid E \leq F \mid \dots$	boolean expressions
C, D	$::= \text{skip}$	statements
	$x = E$	assignment
	$C; D$	sequence
	if B then C else D	conditional
	while B do C	iteration
\mathcal{H}	$::= \{P\} C \{Q\}$	Hoare triples

- (boolean) expressions are free of side effects

Semantics — Domains and Types

$BValue$	$= \text{true} \mid \text{false}$
$IValue$	$= 0 \mid 1 \mid \dots$
$\sigma \in State$	$= Variable \rightarrow Value$

$\mathcal{E}[]$	$: Expression \times State \rightarrow IValue$
$\mathcal{B}[]$	$: BoolExpression \times State \rightarrow BValue$
$\mathcal{S}[]$	$: State_{\perp} \rightarrow State_{\perp}$

- $State_{\perp} := State \cup \{\perp\}$
- result \perp indicates non-termination

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{E}[c]\sigma &= c \\
 \mathcal{E}[x]\sigma &= \sigma(x) \\
 \mathcal{E}[E+F]\sigma &= \mathcal{E}[E]\sigma + \mathcal{E}[F]\sigma \\
 \dots & \\
 \mathcal{B}[E=F]\sigma &= \mathcal{E}[E]\sigma = \mathcal{E}[F]\sigma \\
 \mathcal{B}[\neg B]\sigma &= \neg \mathcal{B}[B]\sigma \\
 \dots &
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 S[C]\perp &= \perp \\
 S[\text{skip}]\sigma &= \sigma \\
 S[x=E]\sigma &= \sigma[x \mapsto \mathcal{E}[E]\sigma] \\
 S[C;D]\sigma &= S[D](S[C]\sigma) \\
 S[\text{if } B \text{ then } C \text{ else } D]\sigma &= \mathcal{B}[B]\sigma = \text{true} \rightarrow S[C]\sigma, S[D]\sigma \\
 S[\text{while } B \text{ do } C]\sigma &= F(\sigma) \\
 &\text{where } F(\sigma) = \mathcal{B}[B]\sigma = \text{true} \rightarrow F(S[C]\sigma), \sigma
 \end{aligned}$$

Proving a Hoare triple

Proof Rules for Hoare Triples

$$\{P\} C \{Q\}$$

- holds if $(\forall \sigma \in \text{State}) P(\sigma) \Rightarrow (Q(S[C]\sigma) \vee S[C]\sigma = \perp)$ (partial correctness)
- alternative reading: $P, Q \subseteq \text{State}$
 $\{P\} C \{Q\} \equiv S[C]P \subseteq Q \cup \perp$

- Proving that $\{P\} C \{Q\}$ holds directly from the definition is tedious
- Instead: define axioms and inferences rules
- Construct a derivation to prove the triple
- Choice of axioms and rules guided by structure of C

$$\{P\} \text{ skip } \{P\}$$

$$\{P[x \mapsto E]\} x = E \{P\}$$

Examples:

- $\{1 == 1\} x = 1 \{x == 1\}$
- $\{\text{odd}(1)\} x = 1 \{\text{odd}(x)\}$
- $\{x == 2 * y + 1\} y = 2 * y \{x == y + 1\}$

Sequence Rule

Conditional Rule

$$\frac{\{P\} C \{R\} \quad \{R\} D \{Q\}}{\{P\} C; D \{Q\}}$$

Example:

$$\frac{\{x == 2 * y + 1\} y = 2 * y \{x == y + 1\} \quad \{x == y + 1\} y = y + 1 \{x == y\}}{\{x == 2 * y + 1\} y = 2 * y; y = y + 1 \{x == y\}}$$

$$\frac{\{P \wedge B\} C \{Q\} \quad \{P \wedge \neg B\} D \{Q\}}{\{P\} \text{ if } B \text{ then } C \text{ else } D \{Q\}}$$

Examples:

$$\frac{\{P \wedge x < 0\} z = -x \{z == |x|\} \quad \{P \wedge x \geq 0\} z = x \{z == |x|\}}{\{P\} \text{ if } x < 0 \text{ then } z = -x \text{ else } z = x \{z == |x|\}}$$

- incomplete!
 - precondition for $z = -x$ should be $(z == |x|)[z \mapsto -x] \equiv -x == |x|$
- ⇒ need [logical rules](#)

- strengthen precondition

$$\frac{P' \Rightarrow P \quad \{P\} C \{Q\}}{\{P'\} C \{Q\}}$$

- weaken postcondition

$$\frac{\{P\} C \{Q\} \quad Q \Rightarrow Q'}{\{P\} C \{Q'\}}$$

Correctness obvious

- Example needs strengthening: $P \wedge x < 0 \Rightarrow -x == |x|$
- holds if $P \equiv \text{true!}$
- similarly: $P \wedge x \geq 0 \Rightarrow x == |x|$

Completed example:

$$D_1 = \frac{x < 0 \Rightarrow -x == |x| \quad \{-x == |x|\} z = -x \{z == |x|\}}{\{x < 0\} z = -x \{z == |x|\}}$$

$$D_2 = \frac{x \geq 0 \Rightarrow x == |x| \quad \{x == |x|\} z = x \{z == |x|\}}{\{x \geq 0\} z = x \{z == |x|\}}$$

$$\frac{\frac{D_1}{\{x < 0\} z = -x \{z == |x|\}} \quad \frac{D_2}{\{x \geq 0\} z = x \{z == |x|\}}}{\{\text{true}\} \text{ if } x < 0 \text{ then } z = -x \text{ else } z = x \{z == |x|\}}$$

While Rule

$$\frac{\{P \wedge B\} C \{P\}}{\{P\} \text{ while } B \text{ do } C \{P \wedge \neg B\}}$$

- P is [loop invariant](#)

Example: try to prove

```
{ a>0 /\ i==0 /\ k==1 /\ sum==1 }
while sum <= a do
  k = k+2;
  i = i+1;
  sum = sum+k
{ i*i <= a /\ a < (i+1)*(i+1) }
```

⇒ while rule not directly applicable ...

Step 1: Find the loop invariant

```
a > 0 ∧ i == 0 ∧ k == 1 ∧ sum == 1
=>
i * i <= a ∧ i >= 0 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == (i + 1) * (i + 1)
```

- $P \equiv i * i \leq a \wedge i \geq 0 \wedge k == 2 * i + 1 \wedge sum == (i + 1) * (i + 1)$ holds on entry to the loop
- To prove that P is an invariant, requires to prove that $\{P \wedge sum \leq a\} k = k + 2; i = i + 1; sum = sum + k \{P\}$
- It follows by the sequence rule and weakening:

```
{ i * i <= a ∧ i >= 0 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == (i + 1) * (i + 1) ∧ sum <= a }
{
  i >= 0 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == (i + 1) * (i + 1) ∧ sum <= a }
k = k + 2
{
  i >= 0 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == (i + 1) * (i + 1) ∧ sum <= a }
{
  i + 1 >= 1 ∧ k == 2 * (i + 1) + 1 ∧ sum == (i + 1) * (i + 1) ∧ sum <= a }
i = i + 1
{
  i >= 1 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == i * i ∧ sum <= a }
{ i * i <= a ∧ i >= 1 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum + k == i * i + k ∧ sum + k <= a + k }
sum = sum + k
{ i * i <= a ∧ i >= 1 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == i * i + k ∧ sum <= a + k }
{ i * i <= a ∧ i >= 1 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == i * i + 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum <= a + k }
{ i * i <= a ∧ i >= 1 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == (i + 1) * (i + 1) ∧ sum <= a + k }
{ i * i <= a ∧ i >= 0 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == (i + 1) * (i + 1) }
```

Properties of Formal Verification

Step 2: Apply the while rule

$$\frac{\{P \wedge sum \leq a\} k = k + 2; i = i + 1; sum = sum + k \{P\}}{\{P\} \text{ while } sum \leq a \text{ do } k = k + 2; i = i + 1; sum = sum + k \{P \wedge sum > a\}}$$

Now, $P \wedge sum > a$ is

```
{ i * i <= a ∧ i >= 0 ∧ k == 2 * i + 1 ∧ sum == (i + 1) * (i + 1) ∧ sum > a }
implies
{ i * i <= a ∧ a < (i + 1) * (i + 1) }
```

- requires more restrictions on assertions (e.g., use a certain logic) than monitoring
- full compliance of code with specification can be guaranteed
- scalability is a challenging research topic:
 - full automatization
 - manageable for small/medium examples
 - large examples require manual interaction